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Abstract
Countries that have experienced  banking crises have  nonperforming assets. The study suggests  that out of the
adopted one of two distinct approaches toward  the  seven  cases, only Chile, Norway, and Poland  successfully
resolution of nonperforming assets-a centralized  or a  restructured  their corporate  sectors with companies
decentralized  solution.  A centralized  approach entails  attaining  viable financial structures.  The analysis
setting up a government agency-an  asset management  underscores that as in the case  of a centralized  strategy
company-with the  full responsibility  for acquiring,  the prerequisites  for a successful decentralized
restructuring,  and selling of the assets. A decentralized  restructuring strategy  are manifold. The successful
approach  relies on banks and other creditors to manage  countries significantly  improved the banking system's
and resolve nonperforming assets.  capital position, enabling banks to write down loan
Dado and Klingebiel study banking crises  where  losses; banks as well as corporations  had adequate
governments adopted  a decentralized,  creditor-led  incentives  to engage  in corporate restructuring;  and
workout strategy  following systemic crises. They  use  a  ownership links between banks and corporations were
case study approach and analyze seven  banking crises in  limited  or severed during crises.
which governments  mainly relied  on banks to  resolve
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In recent  decades,  many  countries have experienced  banking problems reflected
in high  levels of non-performing loans that required a major and expensive overhaul of
their banking systems.  By one count,  112 episodes of systemic banking crises occurred
in  93  countries  since  the  late  1970s  (Caprio  and  Klingebiel  2002).  The  proper
management  and disposition of impaired assets is one of the most critical and complex
tasks  of successful  and  speedy  financial  restructuring.  Successful  asset  management
policies  can  facilitate  bank  restructuring  by  accelerating  the  resolution  of  non-
performing  assets  and  can  promote  corporate  restructuring  by  providing  the  right
incentives for voluntary debt restructuring.
The  two  alternatives  for  asset  management  strategies  include  setting  up  a
government  agency with the  full responsibility  for acquiring,  restructuring,  and  selling
of the assets (the centralized  approach) or letting banks and other creditors manage their
own non-perfonning assets (the decentralized  approach).  Empirical  studies and/or cross
country analyses on the usefulness and success of either strategy remain sparse. While a
companion paper evaluated  experiences  with centralized  asset management  companies
(AMCs)  (Klingebiel  2000),  this  paper will  focus  on experiences  with  banking  crises
where the responsibility for the workout of bad debt was mainly left with the banks.
We apply a case study  approach  and analyze  seven banking  crises during  which
governments  mainly  relied  on banks  to  resolve  non-performing  assets.  Our  study
suggests  that  out  of the  seven  cases,  only  Chile,  Norway  and  Poland  successfully
restructured their corporate sectors with companies attaining viable financial structures.
The  analysis  underscores  that  the  prerequisites  for  a  successful  decentralized
restructuring  strategy are manifold.  The successful countries significantly improved the
banking  system's capital  position  enabling  them to  write down  loan losses;  banks as
well as  corporations had  adequate  incentives  to engage  in corporate restructuring;  and
ownership  links  between  banks  and  companies  were  limited  or  severed  during  the
crises.
The remainder of the paper is organized  as follows.  Section II  illustrates the two
altemative  approaches  to  financial  restructuring.  Section Im presents  the  analysis  of
seven  country  cases  in  which  governments  mainly  relied  on  decentralized  creditor
restructuring to deal with debt resulting from banking crises.  Section IV concludes.
II.  Approaches to Corporate Restructuring
Two approaches  to financial  corporate  restructuring  can be distinguished (Sheng
1996).  Countries  can  use either  (i)  a centralized  government-led  approach  via  asset
management  companies; or (ii) a decentralized creditor-led restructuring strategy.
Under  a  centralized, government-led approach,  asset  recovery  is  centralized  in
one public agency (asset management  company,  AMC).  A specialized  agency  may be2
required  because  the  task, of dealing  with  non-performing  loans  is  fundamentally
different  from  that  of  making  loans.  Transferring  assets  to  a  centralized  asset
management  company  may  also  increase  leverage  over  debtors  and  break  perverse
ownership  links  between  banks  and  corporations  allowing  for  better  collections  on
loans.  Notwithstanding  these  advantages,  recent  country  experience  shows  that  it is
difficult  to insulate  an  asset management  company  holding a large share  of corporate
claims  against  political pressures.  Moreover,  a  transfer of the loans breaks  the  links
between  banks  and  corporations-relationships  made  valuable  by  banks'  access  to
corporate  information.  And if an  asset management company  fails to actively manage
the assets it holds, it can undermine credit discipline in the entire system. The evidence
on how successful  AMCs have been is mixed (Klingebiel 2000).
Box 1: The Use of Asset Management Companies in the Resolution  of Banking Crises -
Cross Country Experience
In the  past, asset management  companies  (AMCs)  have been employed  to address  the overhang of bad
debt in the financial system. Two main types of AMCs can be  distinguished:  AMCs  set up to help and
expedite  corporate  restructuring  and AMCs  established as rapid  asset disposition  vehicles.  A  review of
seven cases reveals that AMCs have  a  mixed record.  In two  out of three cases, corporate  restructuring
AMCs  did  not  achieve  their  narrow  goals  of expediting  bank  and/or  corporate  restructuring.  These
experiences  suggest  that  AMCs  are  rarely  good  tools  to  expedite  corporate  restructuring.  Only  the
Swedish  AMC  successfully  managed  its  portfolio,  acting  in  some  instances  as  lead  agent  in  the
restructuring  process.  It  was  helped  by some special  circumstances,  however:  the assets acquired  were
mostly real estate related, not manufacturing (that are harder to restructure),  and were a small fraction of
the  banking  system  (which  made  it easier  for  the  AMC  to maintain  its  independence  from  political
pressures  and to sell assets  back to the private  sector).  Rapid  asset disposition vehicles fared  somewhat
better with two out of four agencies,  namely Spain and the US, achieving  their objectives.  The successful
experiences  suggest  that  AMCs  can  be  effectively  used,  but  only  for  narrowly  defined  purposes  of
resolving  insolvent and unviable financial  institutions and selling of their assets. But even achieving these
objectiyes  required  many  ingredients:  a  type  of asset  that  is  easily  liquifiable  (real  estate),  mostly
professional  management,  political independence,  a skilled resource base,  appropriate funding,  adequate
bankruptcy  and  foreclosure  laws,  good  information  and  management  systems,  and  transparency  in
operations  and processes.  In the Philippines and Mexico,  the success of the AMCs was doomed from the
start as  the  governments  transferred  politically  motivated  loans  and/or  fraudulent  assets to  the  AMCs
which  are  difficult  to  be resolved  or to  be  sold off by  a  govermnent  agency  susceptible  to  political
pressure  and  lacking  independence.  Both of these  agencies  did not  succeed  in achieving  their  narrow
objectives.
Source: Klingebiel,  2000.
The  decentralized, creditor-led work-out. approach  relies  on  banks  and  other
creditors to resolve non-performing  loans. Since banks have the institutional knowledge
of the borrower,  and since  their own  survival  depends on asset recovery,  they may be
better  able  and  willing  to  maximize  recovery  value  and  avoid  future  losses.
Furthermore, banks can provide new loans in debt restructuring.3
Box 2: Advantages and Disadvantages  of Decentralized  Creditor led Approach  to Financial
Restructuring
Advantages
*  Ensures that the informational  capital that banks have accumulated on their borrowers is preserved.
*  Leaving loans in banks may provide better incentives for recovery and for avoiding future losses by
inproving loan approval and monitoring procedures.
*  Leaving loans in banks avoids the general  deterioration of payment discipline that can occur if assets
are transferred to an AMC which fails to properly  manage them.
*  Banks can provide additional  financing which may be necessary in the restructuring process.
*  Political considerations  in restructuring decisions are limited as the actual restructuring is left to the
private sector and not transferred to a public agency which may be prone to political pressure.
Disadvantages
*  Economies of scale - i. e. consolidation of scarce work out skills  and resources  - are not achieved.
*  Ownership links between banks and corporations  are not dealt with and may thus imnpede corporate
restructuring.
*  May prove a distraction for banks' core business of '"making loans".
*  Banks typically are not good at restructuring which requires different types of skis.
The  remainder  of  the  paper  looks  at  the  experience  of  banking  crises  where  the
responsibility  for the debt workouts was mainly left with the banks.
HI.  Cross Country Experience with Decentralized-Creditor Led Restructuring
A.  Methodology
Sample  selection.  We adopted  a two  step  approach  in  selecting  country  cases  for  our
detailed  analysis.  First,  on the basis of a survey of past banking crises  (Caprio  and Klingebiel
2002), we identify twelve cases in which governments  largely adopted decentralized  creditor-led
strategies.  These  are  seven emerging  market economies  (Argentina,  Brazil, Chile,  Colombia,
Thailand,  Turkey,  Venezuela),  two  industrialized  countries  (Japan  and  Norway)  and  three
transition  economies  (Hungary,  Poland  and  Slovenia).  Second,  we  conduct  an  extensive
investigation  of the availability  of detailed information  and data on the resolution  process.  In
five  out of the  12  cases,  we  have  insufficient  detailed  information  to  undertake  a thorough
analysis  as we do not have complete  information on corporate restructuring  strategies including
the scope of corporate  distress, applied work-out mechanism, and financial data on the corporate
sector  and  banking sector.  These  country  cases  are Brazil,  Colombia,  Slovenia,  Turkey and
Venezuela.  We therefore  analyze  seven country cases which include two industrialized  countries
[Japan  (1991-present)  and Norway  (1987-93)],  three  emerging  market  economies  [Argentina
(1980-82),  Chile  (1981-86),  and  Thailand  (1997-present)]'  and  two  transition  countries
[Hungary (1991-95)  and Poland (1992-95].
l It is important  to point out here  that the  analysis  of the Thai  case  has to a prelirninary  evaluation  as  the crisis
started in 1997, and the latest corporate  data we have for Thailand dates from mid-2001.4
Information sources.  Our analysis  relies  on published  reports  and  World  Bank  internal
documents.  We  supplement  these  sources  with  extensive  interviews  with  country  experts
familiar with the details of the individual  country cases.
Case studies.  We use  a  case  study approach  and carry  out  an analysis  that is aimed  at
characterizing  the  incentive  structure  under  which  banks  and  firms  operated  - or  initial
conditions - at the onset of the  crisis and five years  after  the crisis  started.  While  institutional
changes  are not always  easy to implement, especially  when they need parliamentary  approval-
as in the case of bankruptcy regimes-this period should provide governments  in those countries
where the incentive framework is not conducive to corporate restructuring with sufficient time to
improve the framework.
We proceed by first summarizing  the main characteristics  of the specific banking crisis -
type of distress,  size of the nonperforming  loans at the peak of the banking crisis  and  scope of
corporate distress to  get  a better understanding  of the type  and severity of the banking crises  in
the  sample  countries.  We  continue  by  analyzing  the  incentive  framework  that  banks  and
corporations  are  subject  to  at  the  beginning  of the  crisis  and  then  examine  the  changes
governments made to the framework five years after the start of the crisis.  We focus particularly
on  four  components  of the  incentive  framework  that  have been  found  in the  literature  to be
important to encourage banks and corporations to engage in meaningful  corporate restructuring:
(i) banks' capital positions and therefore their ability to withstand  losses; (ii) the accounting  and
(iii) legal  framework in which banks and corporations are operating as it indicates  to what extent
banks  and  corporations  have  (correct)  incentives  to  come to  the negotiating  table  and  reach
solutions that result in sustainable corporate financing  patterns; and (iv) existing ownership links
between  banks  and  corporations  (Claessens,  Klingebiel  and  Djankov  1999).  Extensive
ownership  links between  banks  and corporations  would  weaken either  incentives  to engage  in
meaningful  corporate restructuring.
Evaluating outcomes.  The  aim  of corporate  restructuring  is to  attain  viable  financial
structures  within  a  reasonable  timeframe.  Therefore  we  judge  the  success  or  failure  of  a
decentralized  restructuring strategy on the financial health of the corporate sector and evaluate to
what extent the restructuring  has led to financially  viable corporate  sectors  five years  after the
onset of the crisis.
B.  Main Characteristics of Banking Crises
Figure  1 and Table  1 (below) provide information  on the type and scope of distress in the
seven country cases.  All countries in the sample experienced systemic financial crises, that is, a
major part of the banking system of each sample country was affected  and its aggregate  capital
base was exhausted.
The  scope  of distress  in  the  corporate  sector  is  partly  reflected  in  the  share  of non-
performing loans (NPLs) at the peak of the crises (Figure 1).  The level of non-performing  loans
can  therefore  be used  as a  rough proxy for the extent of corporate  distress.  Figure 2 indicates
that levels of NPLs were significant in all sample countries at the height of the crisis - exceeding
30 percent of banking system assets - with  the exception of Norway and Hungary.  Argentina's5
financial  sector  appears  to  have been hit the hardest  among the sample countries  with  NPLs
amounting to over 50 percent of banking system assets (Caprio and Klingebiel 2002).
Figure 1. Peak Level of Nonperforming  Loans (NPLs)  as Percent
of Total Banking System Loans
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Note:  *  denotes  NPLs as percent of  total  banking assets.
Source:  Caprio and Klingebiel  2002:  Intemational  Monetary Fund, International  Financial Statistics
The increase in the number of bankruptcies  (Table  1) also  reflects the extent of corporate
distress.  Among  the countries  for which data were  available,  the most significant  increase in
bankruptcies  was recorded in Argentina,  where bankruptcies  rose by 76% in the first year of the
financial  crisis (Balino  1991).  In Hungary  and Poland,  over 50 percent of the banking system's
non-perforning  loans were  owed by loss-making state enterprises that made up over half of the
enterprise  sector  and were related  to the transition  from  central planning to a market economy
(World Bank  1996).6
Table 1.  Characteristics of Banking Crises
Countrv  T_Re of distress  Corporate sector distress
Argentina  Private  sector debt  The peak rate of increase of business failures  was 76%
(1980-82)  in 1980,  the first year of the crisis  (Balino  1991).
Chile  Private  sector debt  Estimated increase  in number of bankruptcies  from 81
(1981-86)  in 1975 to 810 in 1982 (Velasco 1991).
Hungary  Debts owed by state-owned  Gross  enterprise  losses  increased  from  less than  1%  of
(1991-95)  enterprises, mainly, to state-  GDP in 1988 to 14% in 1992.  By 1993,  50% of 70,000
owned banks.  enterprises (mainly in industry)  were  loss makers.  The
largest  loss-makers  accounted  for  60%  of  total
enterprise losses and 50% of overdue  bank debt (World
Bank 1997a).
Japan  Private sector debt  Corporate balance sheets deteriorated over the  1990s
(1991- ongoing)  and ROEs  dropped from 7.5% in late  1980s to an
average of 2.8%  in the  1990s (International Monetary
Fund 2000).
Norway  Private sector debt  (corporate  Bankruptcy rates rose by 40% a year during  1986-89.
(1987-93)  and household)  Bank losses concentrated  in primary sectors (14%),
mining & export-oriented manufacturing (15%) and
real estate (13%)  (Norway's Royal Ministry of
Finance and Customs 1992).
Poland  Debts owed by state-owned  In 1992, 67% of enterprises remaining  in state hands
(1992-95)  enterprises, mainly,  to state-  were loss makers, mostly in heavy industry  (World
owned banks.  Bank 1993).
Thailand  Private sector debt (real estate)  In 1997, 32.6% of  corporations could not service their
(1997-  ongoing)  debts (Claessens, Djankov, Klingebiel  1999).
Source:  Compilation by authors.
C.  Assessment of the Incentive Framework at the Onset of the Crisis
We  analyze  the  incentive  framework  at  the  onset  of the crisis  by evaluating  (i)  banks'
capital  positions;  (ii)  accounting  framework  and  (iii)  legal  framework;  and  then  (iv)  existing
ownership links between banks and corporations.
a. Banks ' capital  positions.  To  engage in meaningful  corporate restructuring  banks need
to be adequately capitalized  as they need capital to write down loans.  To determine the level of
capitalization in our sample  crises  countries,  or in  other words,  the incentives  of banks  at  the
initial  stage of the  crisis  to  engage in  any meaningful  corporate  restructuring,  we classify the
crises countries into  four categories  according  to the risk adjusted  capital  level of their financial
institutions.  Since  the level of non-performing  loans in the banking system  is highly correlated
with the level of capital, we also use the level of non-performing  loans (NPLs) if information on
capital adequacy  is not available.  We classify financial  institutions'  capital base  as  follows.  A
four  indicates  that  banks  are  well  capitalized  as their  capital  adequacy  ratio  is  beyond  eight
percent and non-performing  loans in the banking system are beyond five percent of total banking
system loan.  At the other end of the spectrum  a one denotes a system in which banks are clearly7
insolvent  as  their reported  capital  level  is below  two  percent  of risk  adjusted  capital  or  total
banking  system  NPLs  exceed  25  percent.  In  four  (Argentina,  Chile,  Hungary,  Poland  and
Thailand)  out of the sample of seven countries,  individual banks were severely undercapitalized
and mostly insolvent with an adjusted capital adequacy ratio of minus two percent.
To illustrate this rating with a few numbers, the Chilean banking system had a negative net
worth of 12.2 billion pesos in the first year of the crisis while  it faced  losses of 70 billion pesos
by the second year of the crisis (Sheng  1996c).  The shortfall in the capital of the seven banks  in
Poland participating  in the restructuring  program  accounted  for 18 percent of their assets  at the
start  of the crisis  (World  Bank  1993).  The  collapse  of the real  estate  and  stock mnarkets  in
Thailand  rendered  substantial  shares  of bank  portfolios  as  nonperforming  and  as  banking
problems reached crisis proportions, the capital positions of banks weakened.  According to 1998
market  estimates  of capital  shortfalls  for  Thai banks,  the  latter  would  need US$30  billion to
weather the crisis (World Bank 2000b).  Japan's banks appeared to be better offin the mid-1990s
with most of them reporting a risk adjusted capital adequacy ratio of  between minus two to plus
two percent  (Kanaya  and  Woo  2000).  But their capital  positions  did not improve significantly
through  the remainder  of the  decade  (International  Monetary  Fund  1998).  Out of the  seven
crises,  countries  Norway's banks  appeared  to be the best positioned  in  the initial  phase of the
crisis to deal  with corporate  distress.  Their risk adjusted capital  adequacy  ratios were  between
two and eight percent.
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Notes:  We group  countries  into four categories  with regards  to the capital adequacy  position of their banks  and or the level of
non-performing  loans  in  the  banking  sector.  A  four indicates  that all  banks in  the  system  are  well  capitalized  and  that  the
adjusted  capital  adequacy ratio (CAR) of the banks exceeds eight percent or the minimum legal requirement  whatever is higher
and  non-performing  loams  (NPLs)  of the  banking system  are  below  5  percent.  A  three  indicates  that banks  are  slightly
undercapitalized  with their CAR ranging between  two and  eight percent and overall banking sector NPLs  are between  6 and  10
percent.  A  two indicates  that banks are  significantly  undercapitalized  with  their  CAR ranging  from  minus  two to plus  two
percent  and  banking  sector NPLs  are  between  10  and  25 percenL  A  one  denotes  a  system  in which  banks  are  severely
undercapitalized  and insolvent  with a CAR below minus  two percent and NPLs exceed  25 percent
Sources: Balino  1991; Bbrish, Ding and  Noel  1996;  Claessens 2001;  Claessens,  Djankov  and Klingebiel  1999b;  Kanaya  and
Woo 2000; Sheng 1996c;  World  Bank 1993; World  Bank 2000b.8
Table 2.  Accounting  Framework
Comparison of the accounting  framework at the onset of  the crisis
and during the crisis
Loan  Loan  Interest
Countrv  classification  provisionin,  accrual  Average
Argentina
Onset  I  1  1  1.0
During  I  I  1  1.0
Chile
Onset  3  2 to 3  2  2.5
During  4  3  4  3.7
Hungary
Onset  3  2 to 3  2  2.5
During  4  3  3  3.3
Japan
Onset  2  2  2  2.0
During  2  2  2  2.0
Norway
Onset  3  4  4  3.7
During  4  4  4  4.0
Poland
Onset  3  2 to 3  4  3.2
During  3  3  4  3.3
Thailand
Onset  1  1  1  1.0
During  3  3  2  2.7
Note: Countries  are scored  on a scale from I to 4 for each indicator with 4 indicating best practice and I indicating furthest away fromn best
practice.
Loan classification  Specific loan loss provisioning:  Interest Accrual
I = loan past due more than 360 days  I = 0%/o  substandard;  50% doubtful;  1000%6  loss.  I = up to 6 months, no clawback.
2 = loan past due more than 180 days  2 = 10-  15% substandard;  50% doubtful;  1000/o loss.  2 = up to 3 months, no clawback.
3 = loan past due more than 90 days  3 = 20% substandard; 75% doubtful; 100%/o  loss.  3 = up to 6 months, with  clawback.
4 = repayment capacity of boTTower/forward  4 = present value of future cash flow or fair value of  4 = up to 3 months, with clawback
looking  collateral.
Sources: Argentina:  Balino 1991; Chile: Barandiaran  and Luders 2000, Larrain, M.  1989, Sanhueza 2000b; Hungary:  Borish, Ding and Noel
1996, World Bank Various years(b); Japan:  Kanaya and Woo 2000, Intemational  Monetary  Fund 2000;  Norway:  Karlsen 2000;  Poland:
Borish,  Ding and Noel 1996, World Bank Various years(a);  Thailand: Claessens, Djankov and Klingebiel  1999b
b. Accounting  framework  for  banks.  Financial  institutions  incentives  to  engage  in
corporate  restructuring  is  also  influenced  by  the  accounting  framework  under  which  they
operate.  Here loan  classification  and loan loss provisioning  rules  for banks  determine  to what
extent banks can carry non-performing  loans on their books without classifying them as such and
can accrue  uncollected  interest.  As a result,  capital  and income  will be  overstated  and banks
have limited  incentives  to engage  in corporate  restructuring  since they can  simply hide losses.
The  sample  countries  were  scored  according  to  how  accounting  rules  compared  with
intemational best practice defined  as follows:  (i)  loan classification according  to the repayment
capacity of borrower;  (ii) loan provisioning based on the present value of future cash flow or fair
value of collateral;  and  (iii)  interest  accrual  rule  requiring  the  recognition  of overbooking  of
interest  income when  a delinquent loan  is declared  nonperforming  (up  to 90  days)  (Claessens,
Djankov  and  Klingebiel  1999b).  Table  2  indicates  that  those  rules  were  poor  and  trailed9
international  best practice  significantly in five (Argentina,  Chile, Hungary,  Japan and Thailand)
out of seven country cases.  Banks in Argentina  and Thailand operated under a weak accounting
framework  that  allowed  them  to  postpone  the  recognition  of loan  losses  and overstate  their
capital positions.  Banks in Thailand had to classify a loan as non-performing  only after  it had
not been  serviced  for  360 days.  At  the  same  time,  they were  allowed  to  accrue  uncollected
interest  income  for up  to  twelve  months  (Alba,  Hemandez  and  Klingebiel  1999).  In  contrast,
Norway's  and Poland's  accounting framework was significantly better in the initial phase of the
cnsis.
c  Legal framework.  The  bankruptcy  system  is  crucial  in  disciplining  borrowers  and
forcing  them  to  come  to  the  negotiating  table  with  good  restructuring  proposals.  Table  3
compares important features of the bankruptcy framework - so-called creditor rights - across the
sample countries.  As  shown  in  Table  3,  the legal  framework  in  five of the  sample  countries
contains two  out of four creditor  rights.  Argentina  only has  one creditor right in its laws  and
Thailand affords  creditors  a relatively high protection  - on paper,  at least - by having three  out
of four creditor rights in its laws.
Table 3. Legal Framework and the Existence  of Ownership Links
No  Efficiency
Restrictions  for  automatic  Secured  Manager does  . Sum of  ofjudicial  Enforcement
going into  stay on  creditor  not stay in  creditor  system  of creditor  Ownership
Count  reorganizations  assets  paid first  reoreanization  rights index  index  nigts  structures
Argentina  0  0  1  0  1  6.0  0.6  2
Chile  1  0  1  0  2  7.2  1.4  1
Hungary  I  1  0  0  2  3.0  0.6  1
Japan  0  0  1  1  2  8.0  1.6  3
Norway  1  0  1  0  2  10.0  2.0  3
Poland  1  0  1  0  2  .3.0  0.6  1
Thailand  I  I  0  1  3  3.2  0.9  1
Notes:
Legalframework. The score for the legal framework  is measured as the sum of four indicators of creditor rights:  (i) restrictions  on organizations;
(ii) no automatic stay on assets;  (iii) secured creditors paid first; and (iv) management  does not stay in reorganization.  An  indicator is scored as I
if the particular  creditor right is provided  in  the country'  s  conmmercial  laws;  otherwise,  it is  scored  as zero.  At  the  outset of their transition,
Hungary and  Poland  had  to develop (i)  legal  frameworks  that were compatible with  laws in market  economies; and  (ii) judicial  institutions  to
enforce  the new laws.  Efficiency of  judicial  system  index assesses the  efficiency and  integrity of the legal environment  as it affects  businesses,
particularly foreign firms.  (The scoring ranges from I to 10.)  The enforcement  of creditor rights  is calculated  as the product of the creditor rights
and judicial efficiency indices  divided by  10.
Ownership structure (Based on methodology developed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  and Shlcifer  1999).
4 = Widely dispersed ownership (firms do not have any shareholders  with voting rights exceeding 20 percent)
3  - Widely dispersed  ownership  and cross-shareholdings  allowed  (firms  are allowed  to own  shares in corporations  that belong to  its chain  of
control)
2  - Controlling  shareholder  (corporations  in  which  shareholders'  voting rights  exceed  20 percent)  and  no cross-shareholdings  in publicly  held
corporate shareholder
I = Controlling  shareholder and at least one publicly traded  company in the chain  of control
Sources: La Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  and  Shleifer  1998  and  1999;  Claessens,  Djankov  and Nenova  2000; World  Bank  1985;  Barandiaran  and
Luders 2000, Sanhueza  2000b; Kopanyi  2000b; Intemational  Monetary  Fund  1999b; Karlsen  2000 and Norway's  Ministry of Finance;  authors'
estimates.10
But  for  an  insolvency  system  to  be  effective,  creditors  need  to  be  able  to  rely on  the
judicial  system to  have these  laws enforced.  Therefore,  Table  3  also  provides  information  on
judicial  efficiency  which assesses the efficiency and integrity  of the legal framework  on a scale
from 1 to 10 with 10 indicating the highest degree of efficiency.  As Table 3 indicates,  among the
crisis countries, Norway has the most efficient legal  system.  Japan's judicial  system also ranked
well  followed by that of Chile and Argentina.  Thailand  trails the sample countries  significantly
indicating  that  enforcement  of creditor  rights  faces  serious  impediments  and  limits  creditor's
ability to use the bankruptcy  system  as disciplining mechanism. 2 Hungary  and Poland did  not
only have to  carry out  a  fundamental  transformation  of their  legal  frameworks  to make  them
compatible  with  laws  in  market  economies,  a process  that  was  almost  completed  by the  late
1990s but they also had to develop modem and efficient judicial institutions to be able to enforce
them (World Bank  1996;  Borish, Ding and  Noel  1996a).  Therefore,  enforcement  capacity was
relatively weak during these countries' financial  crises.
de  Ownership structures.  The  effectiveness  of  decentralized  work-outs  may  also  be
hampered by ownership links between banks and corporations  as the same party would be both
debtor and creditor (Claessens, Djankov,  Klingebiel  1999).  Using a methodology developed by
La Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  and  Shleifer  (La Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  and  Shleifer  2002)  we
score countries on their prevailing ownership structure at the onset of the crisis on a scale from  1
to  four with one  indicating  that one  controlling  shareholder  and  at  least  one  publicly traded
company  is  in  the  chain  of control  (for  further  detail  see  Table  3)  and  ownership  links  are
pervasive.  The results of the analysis reflected  in Table  3 show that ownership  of the corporate
sector  was  relatively  concentrated  and  significant  direct  ownership  links  between  financial
institutions  and  companies  existed  in  four  out  of six  countries  for  which  information  was
available.  These countries were Chile, Hungary, Poland and Thailand.
In Thailand,  ownership  of both  financial  and  corporate  institutions  is concentrated  in  a
limited  number  of  families  (World  Bank  2000b).  Chilean  banks  and  companies  enjoyed
significant  ownership  links  in  the  form  of  "grupos"  or  financial  and  manufacturing
conglomerates  which had acquired nearly all the largest manufacturing  and banking firms in the
mid 1970s  (Velasco  1991).  In  the case of the transition countries - Hungary and Poland - the
large  shares  of non-performing  loans  held  by  state-owned  banks  were  largely  the  result  of
lending  practices  to  state-owned  enterprises  (World  Bank  1996).  The  ownership  structure  in
which the government was  the main shareholder in both banks and enterprises continued  during
the early part of the transition.  Also, that period was marked by continued lending on the part of
state  banks  to  loss-making  state-owned  enterprises  even  as  the  banking  crises  had  emerged
(World  Bank  1996).  The  practice  prevailed  initially  at  least  not  only due  to  banks'  limited
capacity to assess credit risk but also to occasional  interventions  by their major shareholder - the
government - to support socially sensitive state enterprises (Borish, Ding and Noel  1996a).
2  Thailand  has complemented  its framework for corporate  reorganization  and asset resolution for large  corporation
with out-of-court,  extra-judicial  systems,  the Corporate  Debt Restructuring  Advisory  Committee.  This committee
and  associated  restructuring  processes  generally  rely  on  the  so-called  London  rules-principles  for  corporate
reorganization  first enunciated  in the United Kingdom in the early 1990s.  Since the  London rules were not designed
for systemic corporate distress, Thailand tried to tighten them in various  ways to make those rules conducive to out-
of-court restructuring  (For greater detail, see Claessens, Djankov and Klingebiel  1  999b).
'  That  is, credit  under  socialism  was  extended  primarily  on the basis  of the government's  assessment  of a state
enterprise's  importance in the economy, rather than its profitability and ability to service its loans.11
While direct  ownership links  are limited  in Japan, its traditional  keiretsu structure  fosters
not only long held ties among  Japanese corporations belonging to the same industrial group but
also close connections with particular financial institutions (International Monetary Fund  1999b).
In Norway, direct and indirect ownership  links between  banks and corporations  were limited  at
the onset of the crisis, therefore limiting disincentives for corporate restructuring.
Overall conduciveness  of the incentiveframeworkfor  corporate  restructuring.  To show
the overall  conduciveness  of the incentive framework  for corporate restructuring we  construct a
overall  incentive  framework  index.  This index reflects  the unweighted  average  of the scores
sample countries  received  on the four  components of the  restructuring  framework  at the initial
phase of the crises.  These four indicators  are again:  (i) the banking system's capital position; (ii)
the accounting  framework;  (iii) the  legal framework;  and (iv)  existing  ownership  links between
banks and corporations.  Table  4 shows that,  except for Norway,  the sample  countries'  banks
and corporations  operated within  a weak overall incentive framework  that was not particularly
conducive for corporate restructuring at the onset of the crisis.
Table 4. The Overall Incentive Framework at the Onset of the Crisis
Bank
capital  Accounting  Legal  Ownership  Overall Framework
Cqumr  positions  framework  fiamework  structure  Incentive Index
Argentina
(1980-82)  1.0  1.0  0.6  2.0  1.2
Chile
(1981-86)  1.0  2.5  0.7  1.0  1.5
Hungary
(1991-95)  1.0  2.5  0.6  1.0  1.3
Japan
(1991-  2.0  2.0  1.6  3.0  2.2
ongoing)
Norway
(1987-93)  3.0  3.7  2.0  3.0  2.9
Poland
(1992-95)  1.0  3.2  0.6  1.0  1.5
Thailand
(1997-  1.0  1.0  0.9  1.0  1.0
ongoing)
Source:  Tables  I - 3  and Figure  1.
D.  Government Efforts to Upgrade the Incentive Framework
The previous  section indicated  that the framework  for decentralized  restructuring  showed
significant weaknesses  in most of our sample countries in the initial phase of the crisis.  In this
section, we evaluate to what extent countries improved  the overall  incentive  framework  to make
it  more  conducive  to  and  accelerate  corporate  restructuring.  As  mentioned  earlier,  in  this12
analysis we will only consider changes made within a period of five year after the crisis began.
While  institutional  changes  are  not  always  easy  to  implement,  especially  when  they  need
parliamentary  approval-as  in  the  case  of bankruptcy  regimes-this  period  should  provide
governments  with sufficient  time to adjust the incentive  framework  for corporate  restructuring.
We  focus  our  attention  on  the  question  to  what  extent  governments  strengthened  the  major
components of the overall incentive framework,  Annex tables  1,  2 and 3 provide a more detailed
summary of govermnents'  efforts or measures, to support financial and corporate restructuring.
a. Strengthening the loss  absorption capacity  of banks.  In  six out of the seven  sample
countries,  (Argentina,  being the exception)  the authorities  attempted to shore up banks'  capital
position  by providing public  funds.  In  all  cases,  governments  used  ex-ante  upfront  schemes
rather than employing a recapitalization strategy with an ex-post recapitalization  mechanism that
links  banks'  recapitalization  to  corporate  restructuring.  Ex-ante  recapitalization  may  be
implemented  quickly and can  signal to  the market that problems  are  being resolved.  Provided
that it is accompanied  by substantive improvements in corporate govemance and bank operations
and is well monitored, it can be an up-front investment that leads ultimately to lower costs.  But
ex-ante recapitalizations  also carry large risks.  Governments routinely respond to such systemic
bank solvency problems by injecting capital  into insolvent banks, without requiring changes  in
governance and bank operations and the recapitalizations  turn  out to be futile.  Banks will have
better capacity to work out loans and to take losses,  when recapitalized but they may still delay
restructuring and roll over non-perform-ing  loans since they are able to attract new funds anyhow.
And  likewise,  corporations  may  have  little  incentive  to  undertake  necessary  operational
restructuring, if they have access to new  funds anyway (Claessens  1998).  Therefore,  the success
of these  recapitalization  schemes  depend  on  the  following  three  factors:  (i)  the  size  of the
recapitalization  scheme; (ii) the timeliness of the provision of capital;  and (iii) the conditionality
attached to the recapitalization  schemes.
Size of the recapitalization  schemes and repeated recapitalizations. In three out of seven
cases - Chile, Hungary and Japan - the government failed to provide  recapitalization schemes of
sufficient  size, making  additional  injections of capital necessary.  Insufficient capital  injections
do not only reduce  the loss absorption capacity of financial institutions  but they also limit these
institutions'  incentives  to engage  in corporate  restructuring  as they  await the next bail-out.  In
Chile, repeated  loan purchases  reinforced  the perception by both debtors  and  creditors  alike of
the  government's  readiness  to keep  providing  additional  support  (Barandiaran  and  Hemandez
1999;  Brock  1999;  Larrain,  M.  1989;  Sheng  1996c;  Velasco  1991).  Similarly,  after  three
recapitalizations  in Hungary,  banks  remained  too  poorly  capitalized  to  be  able  to  engage  in
earnest restructuring  (World Bank  1999a;  1999b).  Japan  only provided public  support to their
banks  seven  years  into  the  crisis.  To  date,  Japan  has  implemented  two  rounds  of
recapitalizations  - in  1998 and in 1999.  Yet  according to market observers,  the Japanese banks
continue to remain severely undercapitalized  (Goldman Sachs 2002c).
Timing of the recapitalization  schemes.  As important  as the size of the schemes  is their
timeliness.  In  five out of six cases  - Chile, Hungary,  Norway,  Poland  and Thailand-capital
infusions  took place within three years of the onset of their crises  (Barandiaran  and Hernandez
1999; Brock  1999; Larrain, M.  1989; Sheng  1996c;  Karlsen  1994; Norway's Royal Ministry of
Finance and Customs 1992;  Velasco 1991; World Bank  1993;  1994;  1999a; 2000a).  In contrast,13
Japan relied on economic  growth to restore  bank solvency for a seven year period (International
Monetary  Fund  1999a).  During  that  time,  Japanese  banks  were  expected  to  recapitalize  via
increased  earnings over time  and-this was to be made possible by govemment macroeconomic
programs to stimulate growth, implicit forbearance  and low interest rates.  This approach did not
result  in  stronger  balance  sheets  for  banks  and  enhanced  their  ability  to  take  losses.  The
authorities  took  a  more  forceful  approach  to restructuring  in the  eighth  year  of the  crisis that
included government  injection of capital into the banking system (Kanaya and Woo 2000).
Conditionality. Govemrnent  can attach two  types of conditionality to the disbursement  of
public  funds.  Governments  can  either  link  disbursements  to  a  repayment  schedule  (with
penalties for non-compliance)  andlor to financial and operational restructuring criteria that banks
have  to  meet  to  be  eligible  for  receiving  funds.  Except  for  Hungary,  all  of  the  public
recapitalization  schemes  attached  some  conditionality to the disbursement of funds.  The public
recapitalization  programs  in Chile  and Poland  required  time-bound repayments  by the banks to
the government.  In Chile, the government recapitalized  banks through repeated  direct purchases
of substandard  loans with zero  coupon notes under a ten year  repurchase  agreement.  The banks
in turn had to commit to repurchasing  all loans sold to the central bank.  Banks had to redeem 5
percent  of the  recapitalization  bonds  every  six months.  Under  Poland's  enterprise  and  bank
restructuring  program,  seven commercial  banks received new capital  in the form of fifteen year
government  restructuring  bonds that had to be repaid every six months.  Banks  were,  however,
allowed  to sell the bonds  after  three  years.  In both cases,  banks'  inability  or  failure  to service
their  obligations  would  have  resulted  in  government  sanctions.  For  example,  conciliation
agreements  under  Poland's  program  carried  penalties  for non-compliance  and  the  authorities
required  the supervisory  boards of the  participating  banks  to establish incentive  compensation
schemes that linked managers' bonuses to banks' profits (van Wijnbergen,  1994).
In Norway  and Thailand, public  funds were injected into banks  only after the write down
of shareholder  capital,  thereby  resulting  in  a  (potential)  severe  dilution  of ownership.  In
addition,  the capital injections of banks  in Norway were also made contingent upon operational
restructuring.  For  example,  banks  participating  in  the  recapitalization  programs  had  to
substantially reduce the number of branches  and the level of operating  costs so as to raise bank
profitability  and  thereby  help  the  banks  sustain  their  capital  adequacy.  Thailand's  program
included  the option  for the govemment  to require  changes  in bank management.  In Japan,  the
long  delayed  government  recapitalization  required  banks  to  meet  two  criteria  to  qualify  for
public funds - positive net worth and the ability to generate  long-term profits (Kanaya and Woo
2000).
Results  of the public recapitalization  efforts.  Public  recapitalization  schemes  appeared to
have been successfiul,  i. e. resulting in sustainable  financial  structures  in banks in three out of the
six  countries  (second  column  of Table  5).  These  are  Chile,  Norway  and  Poland.  Despite
initially  underestimating  the  extent  of  the  crisis  and  engaging  in  several  rounds  of
recapitalization,  the Chilean government  considerably  strengthened the capital base of the banks
enhancing  their  ability to  withstand  losses  (Brock  1999;  Velasco  1991).  Five  years  into  the
crisis, the banking system moved  from a capital  shortfall to an equity surplus  and banks reached
capital levels between two and eight percent (Skarmeta  1999).14
In Norway,  the government injected public funds into one large commercial bank and three
large  savings  banks  as  well as  a number  of smaller  savings  banks.  Capital  levels  in banking
institutions  improved with risk  adjusted  capital  adequacy ratios  reaching beyond  eight  percent
and system wide NPLs dropping significantly.  The commercial  banking system's  risk adjusted
capital adequacy ratio rose  from 7 percent  during  1981-85  to  10.58 percent  in  1993.  The share
of commercial  banks'  after-tax profits  in total assets improved  from -0.3 percent  in 1987 to  1.2
percent  in  1994.  Commercial  bank  losses  as  a  share  of total  loans  fell  from  its peak  of 5.2
percent in 1991  to 0.2 percent by 1994.
The  capital  provision  in Poland  led  to  adequate  capital  levels  (the risk  adjusted  capital
adequacy ratios  in these  banks ranging from 2 to 6 percent)  in the seven banks participating  in
the restructuring  program  and allowed  them  to write  off a  significant portion of unrecoverable
debts (World Bank  1997b; 2000a).  The public recapitalization  program allowed the seven banks
to achieve  a capital  adequacy ratio of 12 percent by 1995,  i.e.,  three years after the crisis began.
For the banking system  as a whole, the  share of NPLs to total  loans declined from 28 percent  in
1992 to  10 percent  in 1997, i.e.,  five years after the onset of the crisis.  By 1998,  all seven banks
were sold to foreign investors.
The public schemes were less successful  in the other three  sample countries  that provided
public  funds for recapitalizations.  Three  capital injections  (1991-93)  in Hungary  continued  to
leave banks undercapitalized  and their overall  capital positions did not improve  (compare  Table
5).  The recapitalization  programs  were neither  conditioned  on operational  restructuring of the
banks or  changes in  bank management  nor did they provide  sufficient  incentives  to banks  to
address  corporate  distress.  While  the  third  scheme  required  banks  to  sign  consolidation
agreements,  the  latter  did  not  include  specific  quantitative  performance  criteria  nor  specific
remedial measures  that, not surprisingly, rendered the agreements  ineffective.  In  1995, i.e., four
years  after  the onset of the crisis,  a new Hungarian  government  moved  towards  a strategy of
bank  privatization,  largely  through  sales  to  foreigners,  to  improve  banks'  capacity  to  sustain
losses.  The  government  also  made  great  strides  in  privatizing  the  enterprise  sector.
Nevertheless,  Hungarian  banks  reached  adequate  capital  levels  towards  in  1998-despite
repeated recapitalizations-seven  years  after the onset of the crisis and only  after 60 percent of
the banking system had been sold to foreigners (World Bank 1999a;  1999b).
In  Japan,  the  government's  strategy  to engage  in capital  forbearance  left banks  severely
undercapitalized  five years after the onset of the crisis, the timeframe of this study.  Public recap
schemes  initiated in  1998 and  1999 continued to leave banks severely undercapitalized  and while
the  second  round  of  recapitalizations  was  conditioned  on  improvernents  in  the  operating
environment of the financial institutions, it did not result in these institutions  undertaking serious
corporate  restructuring  efforts  (Goldman  Sachs  2002c).  At the beginning of 2002, the market
estimate  of non-performing  loans  in  the  Japanese  banking  system  stood  at  35  percent  of
outstanding loans (Goldman Sachs 2002c).  Therefore,  even today, eleven years  after the onset of
the crisis, banks remain significantly undercapitalized.
Thailand's  commercial  banks  were  reluctant  to  take  advantage  of  government
recapitalization  because of the resulting dilution of ownership and the requirement  for change of
management.  The recapitalization  program offered  banks  Tier 1 capital  support conditioned  on15
these banks  adhering  to  stringent  conditions  including  meeting  strict  loan  loss  provisioning
standards  and changing  bank management.  This  market  based  approach  ensured  that public
funds would have only been provided when shareholders had been wiped out.  Notwithstanding,
banks that needed fresh  capital  could delay  the application  for such  assistance  since they were
allowed  to  recapitalize  on  a  flow  basis  and  comply  with  more  stringent  capital  adequacy
requirements  at a later point  in time.  As  a result, only two  non-intervened private banks  have
accessed  public  funds.  Instead,  banks have raised  expensive  capital  on their own.  Still  in the
end they remain  substantially  undercapitalized  because  of high  levels  of non-performing  loans.
By 2002, system wide NPLs stood at one-third of total loans (Standard and Poors 2002).
Additional mechanism for debt relief In  addition  to capital  infusions,  governments  have
employed schemes  to bail out specific  groups of private debtors which are essentially equivalent
to  bank  recapitalization.  However,  such  efforts  create  disincentives  for  borrowers  to  make
earnest  efforts  to repay their  debts.4 The loan  reprogramming  programs  in  Chile led  to moral
hazard  problems  as  borrowers  expected  more  generous  debt  relief  to  be  forthcoming
(Barandiaran  and Hemandez  1999; Brock  1999; Sheng 1996c).  Repeated refinancing schemes in
Argentina  in 1982  did not help avert the deterioration  in bank  solvency that contributed  to the
second financial crisis that began in 1989 (Giorgio and Sagari  1996; Velasco  1991).
b.  Correcting  deficiencies in the accounting  framework.  The  third column  in Table  5
indicates that the accounting framework  improved in five out of seven  countries.  The adoption
and  enforcement  of forward-looking  loan  classification  soon  after  the  crisis  began  brought
Norway's framework fully to international best practice.  Norway was also one of two countries
(the  other being  Poland)  that  applied  "best  practice"  provisioning  rules  for restructured  debt,
wherein the restructured  loan is reclassified  as perforning and the specific provisions  are lifted
after a period of regular debt servicing  (Karlsen 2000).  At the other extreme,  accounting  rules
remained  unchanged  in Argentina  by the end of the crisis of the early 1980s  and its framework
remained  farthest  from best practice throughout  the crisis period (Balino  1991).  Japan  also  left
its accounting  framework  unchanged  five years  into the crisis.  Only in  1998,  seven years  after
the onset of the crisis,  did Japan introduced forward looking loan classification rules making it in
principle more difficult for institutions to hide their losses.
Improvements to the regulatory  regimes of Chile,  Hungary,  Poland,  and Thailand,  in that
order,  brought their frameworks  closer  to best practice  although some rules  still trailed behind
best  practice.  Chile's  bank  regulations  and the new banking  law of  1986  which  emphasized
market information  dismantled  the  1982-84 practices  of explicit regulatory  forbearance  to  ease
the crisis (Sheng  1996c).  Hence,  Chile's framework  improved  significantly five years after the
crisis began.  Hungary's  amendment  to the  banking  law in  1994, the  fourth  year  of the crisis,
4  Argentina and Chile provided public  debt relief to private debtors through repeated programs  of across-the-board
debt restructunings  or debt reduction.  These included  exchange  rate guarantee  schemes,  de-dollarization  of debts (in
which the government  assumes foreign exchange  losses of dollar denominated  loans), or restructuring of loan terms
for firms that meet certain eligibility criteria.  In some instances, debt relief was extended  to consumer and mortgage
loans  by  rescheduling  interest  and  repayment  terms.  In  the  case  of Argentina,  the  authorities  relied  on  a
merger/liquidation  strategy  for  bank  restructuring  and  alleviation  of indebtedness  of the private  sector  (through
across-the-board  refinancing  programs)  to  avert further  bank failures.  The programs  entailed  refinancing by the
central bank of the loans  of private borrowers,  that  is, extending  loan maturities  at favorable interest  rates.  While
the government did not recapitalizd banks, it helped  them by bailing  out private borrowers.16
resulted  in  a  major  upgrading  of its  accounting  framework,  including  the  introduction  of
forward-looking  loan classification  and provisioning norms.  Thailand significantly upgraded its
classification  and  provisioning  requirements  and  somewhat  tightened  interest  accrual  rules  in
1999 bringing the overall accounting framework much closer to international best practice.  Yet,
immediate  loan reclassification  for restructured  debt  was  allowed,  freeing  up previously made
provisions  after a debt workout (World Bank 2000b).
Table 5.  Comparison of the Restructuring Framework for Banks
and of the Financial Results for the Corporate Sector
(at the onset of the crisis (in brackets)  and five years into the crisis)
Framework for decentralized restructuring  Result
Country  Bank  Efficiency  Improvement  Financial
capital  Accounting  and  Ownership  Overall  in overall  condition of
positions  framework  enforcement  structure  index  index  corporate sector
Argentina
(1980-82)  (1) 1  (1.0)  1.0  (0.6) 0.6  (2)  2  (1.2) 1.2  +0.0  (1) 1
Chile
(1981-86)  (1) 3  (2.5) 3.7  (0.7) 0.7  (1) 3  (1.5) 2.8  + 1.3  (2) 3
Hungary
(1991-95)  (1) 1  (2.5) 3.0  (0.6) 0.7  (1) 3  (1.3)  1.9  +0.6  (1)  2
Japan
(1991-  (2) 2  (2.0) 2.0  (1.6)  1.6  (3) 3  (2.2) 2.2  + 0.0  (2) 2
ongoing)
Norway
(1987-93)  (3) 4  (3.7) 4.0  (2.0) 2.0  (3) 3  (2.9) 3.3  + 0.4  (3)  4
Poland
(1992-95)  (1) 3  (3.2) 3.3  (0.6) 0.7  (1) 3  (1.5) 2.5  + 1.0  (1) 3
Thailand
(1997-  (1)  2  (1.0) 2.7  (0.9) 0.9  (1) 1  (1.0)  1.7  + 0.7  (2) 2
ongoing)  _  __  _  _  I  _  I_I  _  -_I_I
Source:  Tables 2-4 ; Borish, Ding and  Noel  1996; Claessens 2001; Claessaens,  Djankov and Klingebiel  1999a and  1999b;  European Bank
for Reconstruction  and Development  1998; Kanaya and Woo 2000; Karlsen 2000;  Sheng 1996c;  World Bank  1985;  World Bank 2000b.
c  Improving the legal framework.  None of the countries  in our sample made  significant
changes  to their formal balnkruptcy regime and  therefore a number of weaknesses  in the formal
bankruptcy  law were not eliminated (see fourth column Table 5).
However,  four  out  of  seven  countries  complemented  their  formal  framework  for
reorganization  and  debt  workouts  with  out-of-court  extra-judicial  procedures  to  accelerate
restructuring.  In  the  1980s,  Chile  used  private  arbitration  to  resolve  liquidations  and
bankruptcies  as an altemative to the outdated and slow judiciary system (Barandiaran and Luders
2000).  In  the  absence  of fully developed  liquidation  and  bankruptcy  legislation  as  well  as  a
skilled  and  efficient  court  system,  Poland  launched  its  well  known  program  of bank  and17
enterprise  conciliation  in  1993  that allowed  enterprises  to  enter into time-bound,  out-of-court,
bank-led  conciliation  agreements  aimed  at  restructuring  and/or  asset resolution.  At the  same
time,  the  governnent  required  banks  to  initiate  bankruptcy  or  liquidation  procedures  if they
failed to reach agreemnent with their nonperforming  enterprise borrowers (World Bank 1993).
Out-of-court  programs  in  Hungary  and  Thailand  appeared  to  have been  less  successful.
Hungary  tried to  circumvent  an  overburdened  court  system with  a conciliation  program  but  it
failed  due to  a  lack  of transparent  rules  and  penalties  for  non-compliance.  This resulted  in
persistent interventions  by competing government  ministries which completely undermined  the
out-of-court  process  (Kopanyi  2000a;  World  Bank  1997a).  A weak  structure and  inadequate
enforcement  of  the  out-of-court  framework  adopted  in  Thailand  have  not  facilitated
restructuring.  At the  end of 1999,  thirteen  percent of the restructured  cases  reverted  to  non-
performing  status in just  a few months  (Claessens,  Djankov  and Klingebiel  1999b).  Thailand
also  established  a  separate  bankruptcy  court  that  was  intended  to  increase  the  efficiency  of
judicial  procedures  in bankruptcy  cases to  address the main weakness  in its formal bankruptcy
regime  in early  1999.  Following the establishment  of the court, the number of bankruptcies in
Thailand still remained low, however, and fraught with difficulties (Foley 2000).
Table 6.  Features of Out-of-court Corporate Restructuring
Accord provides for  Accord imposes
All or most banks  formal arbitration with  penalties for
signed on to accord  deadlines  nonconpliance
Argentina  No  No  No
Chile  No  Yes  n.a.
Hungary  Yes  No  No
Japan  No  No  No
. Norway  No  No  No
Poland  Yes  Yes  Yes
Thailand  Yes  Yes  Yes
Note:  In Chile, private  agents were allowed to resolve bankruptcies by hiring specialized private  consulting firns.
Sources:  Barandiaran  and  Luders  2000;  Kopanyi 2000a;  World  Bank  1997a;  World  Bank  1993;  Claessens,  Djankov  and  Klingebiel
1999b
d. Severance  of ownership  links.  As  the  fifth  column  of Table  5 suggests,  in  Chile,
Hungary and Poland where direct ownership links were significant impediments to restructuring,
the introduction of new regulations,  public recapitalizations  and foreign entry into the financial
system  effectively  severed  or  at  least  significantly  reduced  ownership  links.  In  these  crisis
countries the government  used the crisis  as an opportunity  to change  ownership  structures  and
sever ownership  links that can hamper  corporate  restructuring.  After the crisis emerged,  Chile
began  to tighten  limits on  cross-ownership  between  financial  institutions  and  corporations  but
more  importantly,  started  to  enforce  them  (Sheng  1996c).5 Moreover,  foreign  entry  into  the
banking  system  further  severed  ownership  links  between  corporations  and banks  (World Bank
1997c;  1999b). Recapitalization  programs  in Hungary  effectively  nationalized  banks  and wiped
5  Banks were required to reduce loans to related companies  to no more than 5 percent of their total portfolios.  By
the last year of the crisis, a new banking  law attempted to eliminate  the practice of related  lending and defined  more
precisely  the concept of "client".18
out the equity of state-owned enterprises  that were also the banks' main borrowers,  thus breaking
the ownership  links between  the two entities  (Abel  and Szakadat  1997; Borish, Ding and Noel
1996a).  The  Polish govermment prohibited  the  seven bank  participants  of the recapitalization
program  from  making  new  loans  to  non-performing  borrowers  (i.e.,  state-owned  enterprises)
(World Bank  1993).  All seven banks  were  sold to  foreign investors  within  five  years of the
launch of the conciliation  program.  The  subsequent  privatization  of the banks  in Hungary  to
foreign investors  had  a more profound  impact ultimately  than the  repeated  public  injections  of
capital  (World  Bank  1997c;  1999b).  To  the  contrary,  in  Thailand  bank  and  corporate
restructuring  continued  to be hampered by direct ownership  links.  And while direct ownership
links are limited  in Japan, indirect links or the keiretsu  structure remained  intact and continued
to hamper bank and corporate restructuring.
Overall  conduciveness of the incentiveframeworkfor  corporate restructuring.  Column
6  in  Table  5 summarizes  the overall  conduciveness  of the  incentive  framework  for  corporate
restructuring  in  the  sample  countries  five  years  after  the  onset  of the  crises.  As  the  table
illustrates, only Chile and Poland upgraded its incentive framework  significantly to reach 2.8 and
2.5 respectively on a scale from one to four with four signaling a highly conducive  environment
for  corporate  restructuring.  Norway,  which  started  out with a  relatively conducive  regime,  as
indicated  by  its  score  of 2.8,  improved  its  framework  to  3.3  thereby  nudging  it  closer  to
international  best practice.  The  remaining  four  countries  made  only limited  improvements  to
their  framework  leaving  impediments  to corporate  restructuring  largely  unaddressed.  Out of
these  four  countries  Argentina's  framework  remained  furthest  away  from  international  best
practice with a score of 1.2, followed by Thailand (1.7), Hungary (1.9), and Japan (2.2).
E.  Results of the Restructuring Efforts
The  aim  of corporate  restructuring  is to  attain  viable corporate  financial  structures  in  a
reasonable amount of time.  Therefore,  we determine that a country's decentralized restructuring
approach  was  successful if it has led to viable  financial structures  of corporations within a five
year time  frame.  We assess on a scale  from one to four the financial  situation of the corporate
sector.  The decentralized  restructuring  strategy  is then judged to be  successful  if the overall
sector either scores a three or a four meaning that the weighted average interest coverage ratio of
corporations  exceeded  three and that the share of companies  with an interest  coverage ratio of
below one is less than 20 percent.
Figure  4  illustrates  that  the  corporate  sectors  in  only  three  out  of the  seven  sample
countries  attained viable financial structures within a five year timeframe.  In Chile, Norway and
Poland  corporate  distress  was  significantly  reduced  during  the crisis  period  and  corporations
were put on  a  sounder financial  footing.  The remaining  four countries-Argentina,  Hungary,
Japan and Thailand-were less successful in encouraging  creditor led workouts and therefore the
finns  in  these  countries  still  exhibited  substantial  distress  five  years  after  the  onset  of their
respective crises.
While  Chile  started  out  with  a  weak  overall  incentive  framework  for  corporate
restructuring,  the  country  updated  several  components  of  the  framework  significantly  by19
strengthening  the  capital base of the banking system, upgrading  the accounting  framework  and
severing  ownership  links  between banks  and corporations.  After underestimating  the extent of
the  crisis  initially,  the  Chilean  government  launched  successive  and  massive  programs  to
recapitalize  the banks  and to bail out borrowers  in order to resolve the  crisis.  However,  Chile's
experience  also showed that the government's lack of a realistic assessment of corporate distress
proved very costly since repeated  recapitalization  and debt relief schemes served to reinforce  the
perception by creditors and borrowers  that the government  would continue to provide  additional
assistance  (Barandiaran  and Luders  2000).  The  programs  for bailing  out borrowers  created  a
serious  moral  hazard  problem  that  initially  deterred  rapid corporate  restructuring.  Following
several across-the-board rescheduling  programs in 1984-85, the corporate  sector started to show
signs of profitability  and improved financial  conditions  (Barandiaran and Hemandez  1999). The
quick  pace  of  the  economic  recovery  was  similarly  a  reinforcing  factor  for  corporate
restructuring.
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Note:  We rate the financial health of the corporate sector according to two factors.  One, the sector weighted
interest coverage  ratio  and  second, the  share  of companies  with  an  interest  coverage  ratio of less than one.
We assess the financial situation of the corporate sector on a scale from one to four based on data availability
for either  of the  two factors  and therefore  we  classify  corporations  into  four categories.  A one  denotes a
situation in which the  weighted average  interest  coverage  ratio of all firms is below one and/or the  share of
companies  with an interest coverage ratio of one  or less is higher than 30 percent.  A two denotes  a situation
in which the weighted average  interest coverage  ratio of all firms is between  three and one and/or  the share
of companies  with  an interest  coverage ratio of one or less is between  21 and  30 percent.  A three  denotes a
situation in which the  weighted  average  interest coverage  ratio of all  firms  is between five and three  and/or
the share  of cornpanies  with an interest coverage  ratio of one or less is between  11  and 20 percent.  A four
denotes a situation in which the weighted  average  interest coverage  ratio of all  firms exceeds  five and/or the
share  of cornpanies  with  an  interest  coverage  ratio  of one  or  less  is  less  than  ten  percent.  Sources:
Argentina:  World Bank  1985; Chile: World Bank 1987; Hungary and Poland:  Pohl, Anderson, Claessens  and
Djankov, 1997;  Japan:  Goldman  Sachs  2002a;  Norway:  staff calculations  using Bloomberg  data;  Thailand:
Claessens 2001.20
The absence of ownership links and the existence of a well functioning legal framework  in
Norway were  favorable  initial  conditions  for restructuring  - as  evident  in its overall  incentive
structure's score of 2.9 (see Table 4).  Adequately capitalized banks as well as the improvements
in banks' operations and in the accounting framework  during the crisis period provided creditors
and  borrowers  with  the  incentives  to  engage  in  restructuring.  Among  the  seven  countries,
Norway's  framework - which scored the highest of the country cases  (3.3) -was the best placed
for  applying the decentralized  approach.  While  it is difficult  to  separate the  effects of proper
incentives  from  the economic  recovery  that began  in  the last  year  of the  crisis,  the financial
positions of both banks and corporations  quickly turned around.
While  the  incentive  framework  was  relatively  weak  in Poland  at  the  start  of the  crisis
(compare  Table  5),  the government  enhanced the framework  by significantly  augmenting  bank
capital positions  and  accounting  regulations  and severing  ownership  links between  banks  and
corporations.  Moreover,  the bank and  enterprise  restructuring  program  included  conditions  on
bank recapitalization  and time-bound  limits on debt workouts.  Poland  succeeded  to reduce  the
bad debt problems of the seven participating banks and managed to encourage  some operational
restructuring  by enterprises  during the period of the program.  The restructuring program  led to
improved  quality  of borrowers,  increase  in  bank  equity,  improved  bank  lending  and  strict
prudential  rules  (International  Monetary  Fund  1999c).  Nevertheless,  two  Bank  studies  have
concluded  that operational  restructuring  as  a result of the  debt workouts  occurred  at a much
slower pace than  expected  (Gray and Holle,  1996a; World  Bank 1997b).  In the end,  the quick
resumption of growth in Poland, as GDP rose at an average 6 percent per year in 1993-96, helped
accelerate  enterprise restructuring (World Bank 1997c; 2000a; Barbone 2000).
The  decentralized  corporate  restructuring  strategies  that  governments  adopted  in
Argentina,  Hungary, Japan  and Thailand were and in some cases  are still severely hampered by
an inadequate  incentive  framework.  In these  countries,  corporate  debt  levels  continued to be
high and companies'  financial structures remained weak, five years into the crisis.
Argentina's  overall incentive  framework was barely strengthened  such that the framework
was still  not conducive  for corporate  restructuring  five  years  after the onset  of the  crisis.  The
government  aggressively  implemented  a  costly  strategy  of bailing  out  insolvent  borrowers.
Along  with  such  strategy,  the  authorities  relied  on  liquidations  or  forced  mergers  of financial
institutions  to resolve the  crisis.  Despite  these  efforts,  the  corporate  sector was  persistently in
financial  distress (World  Bank  1985)  and  the government  failed  to  address  weaknesses  in  the
capital position of banks, accounting  rules and legal framework  amidst a fragile macroeconomic
environment.
With  a weak incentive framework  (a score of 1) at the outset (compare Table 5), Hungary
relied  heavily  on  public  injections  of capital  to  strengthen  the  incentives  for  restructuring.
However,  repeated  public  recapitalizations  - without  strengthening  bank  incentives  and
supervision  nor  empowering the  out-of-court  system  - did  achieve  little progress  in enterprise
restructuring.  Five years later,  Hungary's banking problems continued  to remain unresolved  and
the  financial  position  of the  corporate  sector  continued  to  be  weak.  The  situation  improved
markedly only after the authorities changed course four years after the crisis began and opted not
only for bank privatization but also for a comprehensive reform of the regulatory  framework  and21
serious  macroeconomic  adjustment  (World  Bank  1997a).  Following  the  wide-reaching  and
aggressive  privatization  program  of  the  Hungarian  economy,  a  World  Bank  country  study
concluded  that,  towards the end of the decade:  (i) most firms  have restructured  their operations
although  those  that  remained  state-owned  have  restructured  the  least;  and  (ii)  foreign  direct
investment has been the key to the pace and scope of enterprise restructuring in Hungary (World
Bank  1999b).
Weakly capitalized banks,  inadequate  accounting  framework  and indirect ownership  links
persisted  in  Japan,  encumbering  the decentralized  approach.  For  seven  years  after the  crisis
began, the authorities relied on growth to restore the health of the corporate  and financial sectors.
The authorities largely pursued accommodating  fiscal and monetary policies to stimulate growth
hoping  that  such  a strategy  would resolve the problems  in  the corporate  and baniking  sectors.
Undercapitalized  banks  were  allowed to  languish  for quite  an extended  period.  This  strategy
only  delayed  the  much-needed  restructuring.  For  most  of the  crisis  period,  the  incentive
framework for corporate restructuring hardly improved as it scored 2.2 at the onset and five years
hence.  Only in  1998  the government  began  to take  a more aggressive  approach  and started to
strengthen  the  framework  for  restructuring  in  earnest  with  a  public  recapitalization  program.
This was followed by improvements in the accounting rules and their enforcement.  Nevertheless
the corporate  sector continues to  be weak and  non-performing  loans  in the banking  sector  are
again on the rise (Goldman Sachs 2002c).
Thailand's  overall incentive framework  showed some improvement as the crisis ensued as
the score for the overall index changed from 1.0 to 1.7.  While the government was quick to offer
the injection of public  funds into  the banking  system,  banks  were  slow to  take  this up  as  the
government also allowed  them to recapitalize on a flow basis via retained earnings  and because
the  acceptance  of public  funds  would  have resulted  in the  dilution  of ownership  and  or in  a
change  in management.  The capital inadequacy of banks is compounded by impediments  caused
by accounting rules  that trail behind best practice,  a weak enforcement  of the legal framework
and continued,  although slightly reduced ownership  concentration  and ownership links between
banks and corporates.  Progress  with corporate  restructuring has been  limited and, for the most
part, banks have been willing to engage only in cosmetic restructuring of assets that are "easy to
restructure".  While the  level of corporate distress improved  significantly  in Thailand  compared
to the onset of the crisis,  a large  share of companies  continue to have weak financial  structures
and  more  than  24  percent  of companies  did  not  have  enough  cash  to  service  their  interest
(Claessens 2001), in the middle of 2001, four years into the crisis.
IV.  Conclusions
The scatter plot in Figure  5 indicates that the decentralized  restructuring  strategy resulted
in viable  financial  structures of the corporate  sector  in those  country cases where  the incentive
framework  was conducive  for bank-and  corporate restructuring,  i.e.  countries  scored  relatively
high on the  incentive  framework  index.  Firms  in  only three  countries  - Norway,  Chile,  and
Poland attained  viable  financial  structures through decentralized  restructuring.  The experience
of Chile  and Poland also suggests  that weak incentives  frameworks  at the onset of a crises  does
not necessarily  need  to be a  severe  impediment  to resolving  corporate  distress if governments22
upgrade  the incentive  framework  significantly in a timely manner making it  more conducive to
corporate  restructuring.  As Figure  5 suggests  the financial health of corporations  in Argentina,
Thailand, Hungary,  and Japan did not improve significantly amidst an environment characterized
by weak incentives for corporate restructuring.
The results of the country case studies point to the manifold prerequisites for the success of
decentralized strategies.  They require:  (i) adequately-capitalized  banks; (ii) proper incentives for
banks and borrowers;  and (iii) limited or no ownership links between banks and corporations (as
otherwise the sarne party would be both debtor  and creditor).  The results also  indicate  that  the
speed with which governments  improve  the incentive  framework  for corporate restructuring  is
important to achieve  sustainable financial  structures of corporations  and to accelerate  corporate
restructuring.
Figure 5.  Success  of Decentralized  Corporate Restructuring Strategies
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Financial institutions need to be adequately capitalized to have the loss absorption capacity
to engage in sustainable  corporate restructuring.  If governments  allow banks to recapitalize  via
increased  earnings  over  a longer  time  horizon,  either  through implicit  or explicit  forbearance,
banks'  ability to engage in meaningful  corporate restructuring  is limited.  Forbearance  does not
create  stronger  balance  sheets  necessary  for  the  absorption  of  losses.  Marginally  capitalized
banks  often tend  to engage  in cosmetic  restructuring  such  as maturity extension  or interest rate
reduction  which  may not lead to sustainable  corporate  financial  structures.  And, cross country
experience  shows  that  forbearance  dilutes  financial  institutions'  incentives  to  negotiate  more
forcefully  with the controlling shareholder of distressed corporations.
Thus, decentralized  strategies  often require governnents  to help  strengthen banks'  capital
position,  if financial  institutions  deemed  viable  cannot  obtain  capital  exclusively  from  private23
sources.  One  option governments  can  consider for  strengthening  banks'  capital  position is  ex-
post  rather  than  ex-ante  recapitalization.  Experience,  including  that  of Hungary,  Japan,  and
Thailand  has  shown  that  recapitalizing  banks  ex-ante  does  not  necessarily  ensure  that
restructuring will take place,  and may create considerable moral hazard.  Ex-post recapitalization
links  government  support  to  a  financial  institution's progress  in  debt restructuring.  The  most
explicit form of ex-post  recapitalization would be to implement  a loss sharing rule by which the
government  would  cover a certain  percentage  of the  loss  arising  from  corporate  restructuring
deals.
To  put bite  into the  incentive  framework  for  restructuring,  governments  need  to tighten
provisioning and classification rules for bank loans if these rules are not in line with international
best  practice  and  also  adjust  rules  for  corporations.  It  often  also  means  requiring  financial
institutions to apply those rules uniformly to standard,  restructured,  or rescheduled  loans and to
ensure that classification is based on a borrower's demonstrated ability to repay.
Implementing tougher accounting requirements  often present  a trade-off for governments.
Requiring  financial institutions  to more realistically mark their assets to market and to provision
restructured  debt properly has short-term repercussions on financial institutions'  capital positions
and often increase their capital needs.  Yet, international  experience shows that meeting these up-
front costs early on improves banks'  incentives for loan recovery  and proper restructuring  and
may thus yield significantly lower fiscal costs ultimately (Honohan and Klingebiel 2000).
Effective insolvency  systems facilitate the rehabilitation of enterprises  and also provide an
efficient  mechanism  for  the  liquidation of those  enterprises  that  cannot  be  rehabilitated.  In
addition,  rehabilitation  procedures  may  help  overcome  coordination  problems  of  different
creditors if they allow courts to impose restructuring agreements over the objections of creditors.
Moreover,  in  economies  undergoing  transition,  making  state-owned  enterprises  subject  to
insolvency laws sends a clear signal that there is a limit to the amount of public financial support
the firms can count on.
A  question,  however,  here  is  whether  indeed  rehabilitation  can  be  achieved  most
effectively through the application of a formal procedure.  In a systemic crisis in particular, many
countries  rely  on  liquidation  proceedings  as  the  principal  mechanism  for  rehabilitating
enterprises.  The very existence of liquidation proceedings  create  incentives  for an out-of court
restructuring and because an enterprise can be sold as a going concern liquidation can provide an
effective vehicle for rehabilitation (Hagan 2000; International Monetary Fund 1999).
If bankruptcy  procedures  are  lengthy  and weak,  debtors  have  incentives  to  ride out the
economic  downturn  without  diluting  ownership  which  may inhibit  deeper  restructuring.  Well
functioning legal procedures  and good access to courts are therefore crucial.  Even if an adequate
bankruptcy  law  exists,  cross-country  experience  shows  that  effective  implementation  of the
framework  is  even  more  important.  In  particular,  given  the  complexity  and  the  urgency  of
insolvency  proceedings,  effective  implementation  requires judges  and  administrators  who  are
efficient,  ethical  and  adequately  trained  in  commercial  and  financial  matters  (Hagan  2000;
International Monetary Fund 1999).24
Finally, ownership  links between  debtors  and borrowers  also  hamper the  effectiveness of
decentralized  work-out  strategies.  Extensive  ownership  links can  lead to a deadlock  of claims
that may be difficult to break as the same party is both debtor and creditor.25
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Annex Table 1. Government Policies to Resolving Bank and Corporate Distress
Country  Type of  Scope of distress  Government resolution strategy
distress  (Peak level of NPLs as percent
(public or  of financial system assets)
private debt)
Financial Sector  Corporate Sector  Provision of  Closure of  Public recapitalization program  Private injection of  Public debt relief
(level of NPLs  liquidity  financial  capital  program
at peak as %  of  support  institutions  Public funds for  Take up
banking system)  recapitalization  (conditions
and type  of program)
Argentina  *  Private  Estimated at  Peak real  rate of  No  Yes.  No  Not applicable  Not applicable  Yes.
(198042)  sector debt  50%  increase of business  83 institutions  (i)  Repeated
(1979-81)  failures was 76% in  closed by end  refinancing
1980, the first year of  1982.  programs for
the crisis.  (Measured  private debt in
as liabilities  of firms  1981-82; (ii)
declared bankrupt  government
deflated by WPI.)  assunmpion of
private foreign debt
liabilities in 1981 -




exchange  rate.  a
Prinmay resolution mechanism was liquidabon  of financial institutons.  Fiscal cost of refinancing amounted  to 7% of GDP.33
Country  Type of  Scope of distress  Government resolution strategy
distress  (Peak level of NPLs as percent
(public or  of financial system assets)
private debt)
Financial  Sector  Corporate Sector  Provision of  Closure of  Public recapitalization  program  Private injection of  Public debt relief (level of NPLs  liquidity  financial  capital  program at peak as %  of  support  institutions  Public funds for  Take up banking system)  recapitalization  (conditions
and type of program) Chile  *  Private  35.4% of loans  Estimated increase in  Yes.  Yes.  Yes.  25 of 42 institutions  Yes.  Yes. (1981-86)  sector debt  (1986)  number  of  Errergency  3 of II  financial  Feb  1984  loan purchase  sold bad loans to the  'Yapitalismo  Repeated programs: USS5.5 billion  bankruptcies from 81  loans  institutions  programs to non-  central bank  Popular"program  (i) various across- in  1975 to 810 in  extended to  intervened in  intervened banks but no  amounting to  20/  of  for privatization of  the-board debt 1982.  banks at the  1981-82 were  conditions  on bank  the total loans in the  4 intervened  banks  rescheduling
start of the  liquidated  in  restructuring were  banking system.  to small individual  programs  (such as crisis.  1983.'  required.  The central bank  Loan purchase  investors injected  debts of "productive
purchased loans up to  improved the solvency  new capital into the  debtors",  medium-
150%o of capital and  of  non-intervened  banks accompanied  sized businesses,
reserves and the banks in  banks and accelerated  by subsidies.  transport
tum purchased  interest-  the recognition of  companies,
bearing central bank  required provisions.  mortgage &
promissory notes at  . consumer  loans);
favorable terms.  Bank  (ii)  preferential
shareholders  were required  exchange  rate
to commit all dividends to  scheme; (iii)
the repurchase  until the  govemment's
purchase  obligation was  assumption of
completed. Administration  foreign exchange
of the purchased loan  losses through de-
portfolio, however,  dollarization of









Cumulative cost of liquidations amounted  to 11% of GDP (Barandiaran  and Hemnandez  1999).
The fiscal  coats  toGDP oftheprograms  were2.7%,  14.7% and 6.1%ofGDP.34
Country  Type of  Scope of distress  Government resolution strategy distress  (Peak level of NPLs as percent
(public or  of financial system assets)
private debt)
Financial Sector  Corporate Sector  Provision of  Closure of  Public recapitalization  progran  Private injection of  Public debt relief (level of  NPIs  liquidity  financial  capital  program at peak as %  of  support  institutions  Public funds for  Take up banking system)  recapitalization (conditions
and type of program) Hungary  *  Debts owed  26% of loans  Gross enterprise  Yes  Yes.  Yes.  14 banks (including  Yes.  No (1991-95)  by state-  (1994)  losses increased  from  But not until  Three recapitalization  the 5 largcst state-  Govemment owned  less than 1%  of GDP  1986.  programs of one per year  owned  conunercial  adopted new enterprises,  in 1988 to 14% in  One bank was  during 1991-93 without  banks) and 60 savings  strategy after the mainly, to  1992.  In  1993, on the  liquidated and  subjecting the banks to any  cooperatives  1991-93 state-owned  basis of A  MOF  one specialized  serious conditions,  In  the  pasticipated  in  the  recapitalizations banks.  survey, 50% of  bank surrendered  1992-1993 programs, the  1992 scheme.  But in  that focused solely 70,000 enterprises  bank license.  government carved out  1993, 8 banks,  on bank (mainly in industry)  90°h of the face  va!ue of  including  3 of the  privatization  from were loss makers.  the NPL portfolio in  largest banks, and  1994 onward. The largest loss-  exchange for government  many cooperatives making firms (about  bonds, while  the banks  were found to be 500) accounted  for  assumed  lO!Yo  of the face  significantly capital- 60% of total  value of losses.  The 1993  deficient.  The 1993 enterprise  losses and  scheme required banks to  scheme entailed  an 50% of overdue bank  sign a consolidation  initial recapitalization debt. I  agreement  with the  of the insolvent banks
government to ensure  their  to  K0  CAR and two
operational  and financial  subsequent
restructuring; in practice.  recapitalizations  to
these agreernent  did not  bring the banks to 4%
specify quantitative  and 8% CAR.
performance criteria and  Cunulative
targeTs nor specify  recapitalization  was
remedial  rnasures. "  US$3.5 billion  or 8%
of 1994 GDP.
Private banks  consisted of small  cooperative  banks catering  to the financing needs of pivate fannerm  and rural households. 'G Gross  enterprise losses rose from 1%  of  GDP in 1988 to 14% in 1992 (World Bank 1997a).
Borish, Ding and Noel  1996a.
2  Also, thcre were no sanctions  for nonr-conpliance.35
Country  Type of  Scope of distress  Government resolution strategy
distress  (Peak level of NPLs as percent
(public or  of financial system assets)
private debt)
Financial Sector  Corporate Sector  Provision of  Closure of  Public recapitalization program  Private injection  of  Public debt relief
(level of NPLs  liquidity  financial  capital  program
at peak as %  of  support  institutions  Public funds for  Take  up
banking system)  recapitalization (conditions
and Mye  of progmam)
Japan  *  Private  30% of loans  Corporate balance  Yes.  Yes.  Yes.  In  1998,18 najor  and  No
(1991-  sectordebt  (1998)  sheetsdeteriorated  Forthefirst  Up  to  late  1997,  Government  threeregionalbanks
ongoing)  over the 1990s and  seven  years of  government  recapitalization  scheme put  received Yen 1.8
ROEs dropped from  the crisis,  relied  on  in place in 1998 and again  trillion in public funds.
7.5% in late 1980s to  authorities  'convoy"  system  in 1999; ex-ante  The govermment either
an average of 2.8% in  attempted  to  in  which  strong  recapitalization;  purchased preferred
the 1990s.  keep banking  banks  were  Banks had to meet two  shares or subordinated
system afloat  called  upon  to  criteria to qualify for  debt. Thus, all major
by providing  support  weaker  public funds  banks except for one
liquidity  banks.  Closure  *  positive net worth  received public funds.
loans.  of  7  housing  and  In  March 1999, 15
companies  *  ability to generate  banks received Yen
(usen)  down  in  long-term profits.  7.5 trillion 80% of
1995.  Second time around,  which was in the form
Two major banks  conditionality was  more  convertible preferred
nationalized  in  strictly adhered to.  stock.
1998
Norway  *  Private  4% of assets  Bankruptcy rates rose  Yes.  No  Yes.  Direct capital  No  No
(1987-93)  sector debt  (1991)  by 40%ayear during  "Special  terr"  Injection ofequitytoone  injections during 1989-
(Corporate,  1986-89. 1  loans  large commnercial  bank  92: NOK I billion
mostly, and  Bank losses  extended in  (besides  the three  largest  (US$ 155 million) to
household)  concentrated in  1991-92 by  that were nationalized) and  one comnmercial bank;
primary  sectors  the central  to 3 large savings banks  NOK 3 billion  (USS
(14%), mining &  bank to the  and other savings banks.  465 million) to the
export-oriented  banking  savings banks.
manufacturing (15%)  system at




I  Finance companies  were  the first to show the effects of the  emerging crisis in 1986-87  with losses  nainly from property investments exceeding  5% of loans and many companies went out of business and  were
restructured.  In  1987,  three medium-sized  banks recorded  heavy losses that wiped  out their equity capital.  Then, in 1990, the  largest banks  encountered  problems due to heavy loss  provisions.  In contrast to the  first
phase of the crisis in 1987-89 when newly established  firmns faced problemn,  well-etablished  companies especially in trade, hotels and restaurants and real estate, defaulted  on their loans.36
Country  Type of  Scope of distress  Government resolution strategy
distress  (Peak level of NPLs as percent
(public or  of financial system assets)
private debt)
Financial Sector  Corporate  Sector  Provision of  Closure of  Public recapitalization program  Private  injection of  Public debt relief
(level of NPLs  liquidity  financial  capital  program
at peak as %  of  support  institutions  Public funds for  Take up
banking system)  recapitalization (conditions
and type of program)
Poland  * - Debts owed  35.7% of loans  67% of enterprises  Yes  No  Yes.  Upfront  No  No
(1992-  95)  by state-  (1993)  remaining in state  Tobe eligible for  recapitalization of US$
owned  bands were loss  recapitalization, banks  750 million in 1993 of
enterprises  makers, mostly in  were required to have  seven commercial
(SOEs),  heavy industry  (1,992)  independent audits and  banks (18% of the total
mainly, to  Is  portfolio reviews,  assets of those banks).
state-owned  assignment of NPLs to  Recapitalization
banks.  14  sepamte workout units and  permitted these banks
strategic plan submitted to  to write off a
MOF to deal with troubled  significant portion of
assets.  unrecoverable debts.
Thailand  *  Private  32% of loans  32.6% of corporations  Yes.  Yes.  Yes  Govemment injected  No
(1997 - sector debt  (1998)  (1997) could not  Substantial  57 of 91 finance  In place since August  $8.9 billion into
ongoing)  problem.  service their debts  (20% of GDP)  companies;  1998; Ex-ante  private banks and
I of 15 domestic  recapitalization  through  $11.7 billion into
banks  tier 2; a weak link to  public banks
corporate recapitalization
exists through tier 2
capital.
Current  shareholder capital
expected to be written
down to zero before
infusion and govemment
can change nmanagement;
however weak  sticks in
place to make program
credible.
'' Private banks consisted  of small coopeative banks catering to the financing needs of private farmers and rural  households.
"  Loss-making SOEs  not servicing their debts numbered  2000  and accounted  for 40% of the total loan portfolio of nine state owned commecial  banks.  As of September  1992,  some 3000 non-commercialized
enterprises  remained in state hands.37
Annex Table 2.  Incentive Framework at Onset of Crisis
Country  Ownership links between banks and corporations  Banks'  and non-  Accounting  framework  16
rmancials' capital  (Countries are scored on a scale from 1 to 4 for
adequacy positions  each variable with 4 indicating best practice
and 1 indicating furthest away from best
Framework  Pracice  practice.)
Banks allowed  Non-financial  Significant  Significant links  Financial  and
to own non-  companies  ownership  links  between non-  non-financial  Loan  Loan loss  Interest  Average
financial  firms  allowed to own  between  banks and  banks and  companies  linked  classification  provisioning  accrual
financial firms  corporations  corporations  through family
owncrship
Argentina  Limnited.  Pernitted but  No.  But the  Yes.  No  One of the largest private  I
(1980-82)  subject to prior  interfirm market  If any, through the  banks, three other banks
approval of  developed a  highly  interfirrn narket.  and  a number of non-
authorities.  interconnected  bank institutions,  all of
infrastructure that  which  expanded quickly
allowed participants  were considered insolvent
to void reserve  and  were closed or
requirements and  intervened in 1980.  The
regulations on  only institutions that
related Iending,  appeared  solvent were
portfolio  those backed by the
concentration and  government or those
minimum capital.  private banks with well-
established  reputation.
By  1983, many non-bank
institutions  were
liquidated and the rest
were eithe  merged or
transformed with banks.
1  Note:  Countries are scored on  a scale from  I to 4 for each indicator with 4 indicating best practice  and  I indicating furthest away from best
practice.
Loan classification  Specific loan  loss provisioning:  Interest Accrual
I = loan past due  more than 360 days  I = 0%/o  substandard;  50%0  doubtful;  100%/o  loss.  I = up to 6 months, no clawback.
2 = loan past due more  than  180 days  2 = 10 - 15% substandard;  50% doubtful;  100% loss.  2 = up to 3 months, no clawback.
3 = loan past due more than 90 days  3 = 20% substandard; 75%  doubtful; 1  00%/6  loss.  3 = up to 6 months,  with clawbackL
4 = repayment capacity of borrower/forward  4 = present value of future  cash  flow or fair value of  4 = up to 3 months, with clawback
looking  collateral.38
56 Country  Ownership links between  banks and corporations  Banks' and non-  Accounting  framework  '
financials' capital  (Countries are scored on a scale from 1 to 4 for
adequacy positions  each  variable w/ith 4 Indicating best practice
and 1 indicating furthest away from best Framework  Practiee  practice.)
Banks allowed  Non-financial  Significant  Significant links  Financial  and
to own non-  companies  ownership  links  between non-  non-financial  Loan  Loan loss  Interest  Average financial firms  allowed to own  between  banks and  banks and  companies linked  classification  provisioning  accrual financial firms  corporations  corporations  through  family
ownership
Chile  In 1980,  limit  In 1978,the  Yes.  Through  Yes.  Alsothrougb  No  Bytheendof  1983,  3.  Between 2 and  2  2.5 (1981-86)  on bank  maximum  "grupos"or  grupos.  banking system's net  3 "9 investment in  individual  financial and  worth stood at-12.2
a given  holdings of  manufacturing  billion pesos  as it faced
enterprises'  bank shares of  conglomerates.  losses of 70 billion
shares was  3%by  After liberalization  pesos.'  (OrNPLto
raised  from  companies  (in the  mid-  1  970sa,  equity raio rose  from
100/h  to 20%  allowed  under  grupos  acquired  22.4% in 1981  to 158.1%
of bank's paid  the 1974 law  nearly  all the largest  in 1985.)
capital and  was abolished  and manufacturing
reserves.  because  it was  and banking  fitn$s."
difficult to  Grupos  often  used
enforce.  bank credit to
purchase shares in
In  1980, a limit  the banks being
of 5%  for  acquired, with the
unsecured  stock themselves as
credits and 25%  loan collateral.  By
for secured  1982,  related
credits was  lending accounted
introduced and  for  14% of total
halved in the  loans and 21% of
case of  the loans of the five
borowers  largest private
linked to the  banks.
bank.
Hungary  Permitted  Permtitted  When the banking  Links,  if any, were  No  Despite  the 1991-92  3  Betwccn  2 and  2 21  2.5 (1991-95)  sector was  through state  rewapitalizabions of the  3  20
organized  in 1987,  ownership.  banking system, eight
SOEs could own  large banks  (and some
shares of state-  cooperatives) were  still
owned banks.  The  technically insolvent as
big debtors  were the  of 1993.
shareholders.
7  Velasco  1991.
"  Sheng  1996.
" Specific provisions of 100% of past due loans (Sanhueza  2000b).
200%  substandard;  500/o doubtful;  100%  loss
21  1993 Banking Actanmendment (effecdve  1994) introduced mandatory  100% provision  forpast due but unpaid interest although  interest suspension  was not provided (Borish, Ding and Noel  1996a).39
Country  Ownership  links between banks and corporations  Banks'  and non-  Accounting framework  16
financials'  capital  (Countries are scored on a scale from 1 to 4 for
adequacy positions  each variable with 4 indicating best practice
and 1 indicating furthest away from best
Framework  Practice  practice.)
Banks allowed  Non-financial  Significant  Significant links  Financial  and
to own non-  companies  ownership links  between  non-  non-financial  Loan  Loan loss  Interest  Averagc
financial firms  allowed  to own  between banks ard  banks  and  companies linked  classification  provisioning  accrual
financial firms  corporations  corporations  through family
ownership
Japan  Limited to  Permitted,  Banks and firms are  15 largest  The collapse of the real  2  2  2  2
(1991 - holding 5%  provided  total  linked through  families own 7%  estate market and equity
ongoing)  interest.  investnent does  extensive  web of  of banks, 16%  of  prices turned many loans
not exceed  relationships  corporations,  and  non-performning  and
investing firm's  between core  13% of non-  considerably reduced
capital or net  shareholders and  banks.  banks'  capital position.
assets.  main customers  Jusen companies and
smaller banks were
affected the worst.
Norway  Investments of  Generally,  there  No  No  No  Banks were poorly  3  4  4  23  3.7
(1987 - 93)  up to 490/%  in  is a maximum  capritalized and had little
single  ownership limit  to cushion themselves
companies;  of 10% of any  against loan losses.
only 4% of  single owner of  Baning Law of 1972
total  bank  a financial  required each bank to
assets  institution;  maintain 6.5% CAR
permitted to  some  when the prevailing ratio
be invested in  exceptions.  prior to 1972 was 8%.
shares.
Poland  Permitted up  Permitted  Links, if any, were  Links, if any, were  No  1991 portfolio reviews of  3 2  Between 2  and  4  2  3.2
(1992-95)  to 25% of the  through state  through state  the seven  state-owned  3  27
bank's capital.  ownership.  ownership.  commercial banks
24.  showed them to be
insolvent in  the
aggregate.  The capital
shortfall of  these  seven
banks was significant and
estimrated  at US$750
million.  21
22  Bank holding companies  and their subsidiaries are allowed to bold in the aggregate up to 15% of the total shares of non-financial  companies.
22 1987 banldng regulations stipulated  that banks could not enter as income any unpaid interest on NPLs (Karlsen  2000).
24 The central  bank may grant exceptions to the limitation.  Non-financial assets  acquired by banks during bank conciliation or restructuring  agreements  were encouraged  to be  sold within 2-3 years.
25  Agricultural  bank and  the housing  bank.
'6  Substandard  loans include those past due between  7 and 90 days.
27 20% substandard;  50%/o  doubtful;  I100%  loss
2'  Interest due but not received  was not taxable.  Provisions  for losses  can be made before tax as in the case of loans classified  as doubtful or loss.40
Country  Ownership  links between banks and corporations  Banks'  and non-  Accounting framework  16
financials' capital  (Countries are scored on a scale from 1 to 4 for
adequacy positions  each variable with 4 Indicating best practice
and 1 indicating furthest away from best
Framework  Practice  practice.)
Banks allowed  Non-financial  Significant  Significant links  Financial and
to own non-  companies  ownership links  between non-  non-fnancial  Loan  Loan loss  Interest  Averge
financial finns  allowed to own  between banks and  banks and  companies linked  classification  provisioning  accrual
financial firmns  corporations  corporations  through family
ownership
Thailand  Yes  Yes;  statutory  No.  No.  Yes  29  Many weakpublic and  I  1  l
(1997-  linit 5%;  private conumercial
ongoing)  banks.
29  It hasbeen estimnated,  forexarrple, thatthetop  10 famniliescontrolled46.2percentofthenuarketcapitalization  of listed fimisasofend-1996,ofwhichholdings  in financial institutions accounted for  18.3 percent
of  their wealth  and in corporations for the rest (World Bank 2000b).41
Changes in Incentive Framework During Crisis
Country  Ownership links between banks and corporations  Banks'  and non-
financials'  capital
Changes in  framework  Changes in ownership structure  adequacy positions
Banks allowed to  Non-financials  Nationalization  Privatization  Sale to  Concentration of  Assets  Assets held by
own non-financials  allowed  to own  (share  of  assets held  foreigners  ownership  carved out  state as shalm  of
financials  by state-owned)  control among  GDP
top 15 families
Argentina  Not applicable  Not  Not applicable  Analysis of banks covering
(1980-82)  applicable  1982-86 showed continuous
decline in ROE and
weakening of loan
portfolios.  By 1986, banks
representing 26% of total
bank assets had lost at least
50% of their equity while
institutions  accounting  for
41%  had negative real return
on equity. 30 Chile  Not permitted.  Pernitted up to  In  1981/2,  11  The five  Two banks  Not applicable  Not  Not applicable  Loan purchase programs  in
(1981-86)  1O
0/o of bank's  institutions  were  intervened  intervened in  applicable  general  gave the banks the
shares and  intervened of which  banks that  1981/82  possibility of writing off bad
Superintendent's  9 finance  were not  were sold to  loans over a 1  0-year period.
prior approval.  companies were  liquidated  foreigners.  Privatization of  4 intervened
liquidated.  Two  were  Of  the banks  banks allowed them  to be
(Loans to related  large banks  were  privatized  by  intervened in  fully capitalized by 1986.
companies were to  later sold  to  1986.  1983, those
be reduced to no  foreigners.  that were
more than 5% of the  In  1983, the  restructured
total portfolio by  government  were sold
end 1990.)  intervened  in 7  mainly to
banks (&  I finance  domestic
company) though 3  investors










30  World  Bank 1998.42
Country  Ownership links between banks and corporations  Banks'  and non-
financials'  capital
Changes in framework  Changes in ownership structure  adequacy positions
Banks allowed to  Non-financials  Nationalization  Privatization  Sale to  Concentration of  Assets  Assets held by
own non-financials  allowed to own  (shlme of assets held  foreigners  ownership  carved out  state as share of
financials  by state-owned)  control  among  GDP
top 15 fanmilies
Hungary  No changes  No changes  Recapitalization in  Government  Majority  Not applicable  Not  As of 1998, state  Average CARs of the large
(1991-95)  1991-94 through  implemented  stake in held  applicable  held  minority  mostly privatized  banks
exchange of  bonds  bank  by foreign  stakes in 2 banks  improved  to 13%  in 1998.
for NPLs resulted in  privatization  investors in 7  and 100%  Average in medium private
nationalization  such  in eamest  largest  ownership of I  (de novo) banks was 17%  in
that out of 44 banks  starting in  commercial  bank (due to  1998. "
in operation in  1995.  By year  banks as of  recapitalization
1995,17 were  end,about  1999.  in 1997-98),
majority state-  three fourths  equivalent  to
owned and 5 had  of the banks  0.3% of  GDP.
minority state  were majority





Norway  No changes  No changes  By 1991,  In  1995, two  The sale of  Not applicable  Not  As of 1998, the  Average CARs of
(1987-93)  recapitalization  years after  the third  applicable  state  maintained  commercial banks increased
resultedinthe  resolutionof  largestbank  61%and51%  from7%in 1981-85to
government's sole  the crisis, the  was mostly  stake in the two  10.6% in 1993.  By mid-
ownership or  govenment  to foreign  largest banks that  1990, banks'  capital
rajority  sold the third  investors.  accounted for  positions were considered
shareholding of  the  largest bank.  40% and 30%/o  of  healthy and sufficient to
three largest  total commercial  absorb losses.










50%/o  of the two
largest banks by fall
1997 and to at least
one third thereafter.
"Recapitalization  effectively  renationalized the banks  with the MOF receiving 75% of shares of the banidng system  (Borish, Ding and Noel  1996a)
32  World  Bank 1999b.
3  As of 1998,  GDP = NOK 1100 billion and deposit money bank assets = NOK 1030 billion; government's holdings of the two largest banks = NOK  9195 million.43
Country  Ownership links between banks and corporations  Banks'  and non-
financials'  capital
Changes in framework  Changes in ownership  structure  adequacy positions
Banks allowed to  Non-financials  Nationalization  Privatization  Sale to  Concentration  of  Assets  Assets  held by
own non-financials  allowed to own  (share of assets held  foreigners  ownership  carved out  state as share of
financials  by state-owned)  control amnong  GDP
top 15  famnilies
Poland  No changes  '  No changes  Seven of 9 state  Authorities  Sale of four  Not applicable  Not  38% of banking  Recapitalization  allowed 7 (1992-95)  owned connnercial  ainwd at  banks  applicable  system equity  36  banks to achieve 12% CAR.
banks received  privatization  resulted  in  (1995)  But two specialized banks
government  bonds  of all nine  foreign  (26% of total bank assets,
to raise their capital  state-owned  ownership  1995) are in need of
adequacy.  commercial  shares in the  restructuing. But mnany
banks.  As of  range of 25-  private banks created in the
end 1995,4  56%.  early  1990s with loose
banks with  Initially,  licensing standards would
13%  of  total  bank  face capital shortfalls under
banking assets  privatization  existing requirements.
were  faced  Thus, overall CAR for the
privatized.  By  political  entire banking system stood
1998,  only  resistance to  at6%in 1995.'  In 1996,if
two state-  foreign  loan classification  standards
owned banks  investment,  had been strictly applied, the
remained.  "  specialized banks and nmany-
small banks would have
been  out of compliance. 3
'
Tbailand  No changes  No changes  4 institutions;  Intended for  2 banks sold  53.5 percent  2 percent  127 percent  No.  Main private and large
(1997 - 43 percent (1999)  public  to foreigners;  (finance  (1999)  public banks continue to be ongoing)  institutions  4 pending  companies,  weakly capitalized.
(1999)  1999)
74  Unclear about the position of equity holdings swapped for bad debts in 5 commercial banks (imnplications for managenment  and banks' regulatory conmpliance)  (World Bank 1994).
"  Following  the  first bank privatization,  the banks'  shares  were  put on  the  market and the  subsequent  price  jumnp led to criticismn of the MOF for having  undervalued  the  shares  before going public.  This
prompted the authorities to be more cautious  in selecting investment advisors and caused a slowdown in the process.
'6 As of 1995, total bank assets stood at 42% of GDP.  State held 55% of bank assets.
"  World Bank  1997c.
"  World  Bank 1997c.44
Country  Tax or other  Loan classification and loan loss provisioning  Troubled Debt Restructuring Framework
impediments  to  framework
revelation  of losses  (Same framework as above)
Loan  Loan  loss  Interest  Average  Classification  Debt/Equity Swap  Mergers  and
classification  provisioning:  accrual  guidelines of  Acquisitions
reclassified loans
Argentina  *  Long tradition of the  I  1  I  1.0  No separate  Not applicable  Not applicable





efficiency  of banks.
Chile  *  Tax deductibility of  4  3 39  4  3.7  Not immnediate.  No debt-equity swaps
(1981-86)  specific provisions was  Required permission  under loan purchase
Changes to  allowed.  of the  and rescheduling
prudential  *  Until the tax reform of  Superintendency.  programs.  Swaps were
regulations  1984, the tax rate on  used mainly by non-
were made in  dividends exceeded  intervened  banks,
1985-86.  that of interest income  especially with foreign
debt
Hungary  *  Authorities announced  4  3  4  3  3.3  No separate  Under the
(1991-95)  their intention to adopt  framework.  "  recapitalizationt loan
regulations on  consolidation program
accounting, reporting  in 1992, it was unclear
and valuation of  whether debt equity
restructured debt in  swaps were legal or




Japan  *  Banks were not  2  2  2  2.0  No separate
(1991 - allowed  to deduct from  *  Still  framework
ongoing)  taxable income losses  inadequate
Changes to  incurred as  recognition
framework  consequence of out-of  and under
were made in  court restructuring.  provisioning
1998  This was corrected  of loans.
only in  June of 1998.  *  The book
Also, provisions and  value is still
debt forgiveness  have  used for
not been  tax  valuing
deductible.  securities.
39  Under  1982 law: 20% substandard, 400O/  doubtful, 100%/o  loss (Sanhueza 2000b).
'°  1993  Banking Act amendment (effective 1994) introduced the use of forecasts of potential  losses in classification  and provisioning (Borish, Ding and Noel  1996a).
4'  As of June 1999,  troubled debt restructuring  regulations had not been adopted.45
Country  Tax or other  Loan classification and loan loss provisioning  Troubled Debt Restructuring  Framework
impediments to  framework
revelation of losses  (Same framework as above)
Loan  Loan loss  Interest  Average  Classification  Debt/Equity Swap  Mergers and
classification  provisioning:  accrual  guidelines of  Acquisitions
reclassified  loans
Norway  *  Specific loan loss  4  4  4  4.0  Reclassification  Equity was valued at  None.
(1987 -93)  provisions were fuilly  allowed only after  mrarket value or
tax deductible.  regular servicing.  present value,
whichever was lower.
Provisioning made if
the value of the equity
was lower than the
original debt exposure.
Poland  3  3  4  3.3  Reclassification only  Unfavorable tax
(1992 - 95)  after 3 months of debt  treatment of equity
servicing,  swaps.





Country  Restrictions  for  No automatic  Secured  Manager does  Sum of  Efficiency of  Enforcement  Rule of law  Couption  Specific Impediments
going into  stay on assets  creditor paid  not stay in  creditor  judicial system  of creditor  index  index
reorganizations  first  reorganizations  rights  index  rights  index
43
Argentina  0  0  1  0  1  6.0  0.6  5.35  6.02
(198042)
Chile  1  0  1  0  2  7.2  1.4  7.02  5.30
(1981-86)
Hungary  "  1  0  0  2  3.0  0.6  n.a.  n.a.  The lack ofrmodem and
(1991-95)  efficient institutions and
judicial capacity  is evident
in  the huge court  backlog
for liquidation  procedures
during 1992-96.
Japan  0  0  1  1  2  8.0  1.6  8.98  8.52
(1991 - ongoing)
Norway  1  0  1  0  2  10.0  2.0  10.0  10.0  None
(1987 - 93)
Poland  1  0  1  0  2  3.0  0.6  n.a.  n.a.  Shortage of trained judges;
(1992 - 95)  weak enforcement  of court
judgments; high court
costs for case filing; weak
administration of courts;
outdated/inefficient
registries  for property
rights, entry and exit.
Thailand  I  t  0  1  3  3.2  0.9  6.25  5.18
(1997 - ongoing)
12 Sources  for indices  of creditor  rights,  efficiency  of judicial system,  rule  of law and  corruption:  La Porta  Lopez-de-Silanes,  and  Shleifer  1998,  Claessens,  Djankov and  Nenova  2000;  World  Bank  1985;
Barandiaran and Luders 2000, Sanhueza 2000b;  Kopanyi 2000b; Intemational  Monetary Fund  1999b; Karlsen 2000 and Norway's Ministry of Finance;  authors'  esdmates.
'3  Computed as the product of the  creditor rights  and efficiency of  judicial system indices divided by 10.
"  1993/94  bank and debtor  conciliation program was unsuccessful.  Only t4% of the eligible enterprises  applied to the program.  Banks were  less willing to write offdebts and preferred  to sell assets pledged  as
collateral.  The  negotiations were  frequently interrupted by interventions from the State Property Agency; the selection  process of enterprises  was based on non-financial  considerations;  the agreements  failed  to
specify quantitative  performance criteria and targets and to impose penalties for non-compliance  (Kopanyi 2000a).47
Annex Table 3.  Characteristics of Financial Restructuring Approach Adopted and Results
Country  Government Resolution  Approach
AMC mechanism used  Decentralized Mechanisms  Growth  Other Impediments to Corporate  Results
Restructuring
Argentina  None  Capiral  position ofbanks  Unsound and  poorly managed  Unmited  use of April  1981  refinancing  n  The second  scheme precluded (1980-82)  *  nTe government's strategy of  bank mnergers  public finances  coupled with a  scheme due to: (i) announcement of  an  enterprises with fiscal obligations
and transformation  was not sufficient to  tight monetary policy led to  upconming more generous scheme; (ii)  in arrears  or had distributed attain a capital base that could  support tosses  high  interest rates and  widespread perception  that much  of debt  dividends  above a certain amount when  loan portfolios  began to deteriorate  hyperinflation.  relief was convened to foreign exchange  in the past or were considered again,  that subsequently left the country.  already bankrupt.  A higher than
expected number of enterprises did Accountingframework  not meet the eligibility criteria.  As *  Central bank tightened its supervisory  ofend  1981, on)y about 4% of the function.  But despite  inmproved supervision  debt estimated eligible for and a comprchensive  set of prudential  restructuring  had been refinanced. regulations,  recognition of loan losses still  *  Debt distress recurred  after 1982 suffered from (among others)  the lack of an  and reached crisis proportions in apprpriate systern for classifying loan  1989. portfolio according  to risk and toleration  by
the authorities of banks' own ad hoc
accounting practices towards loss-
provisioning.
Legal framnework
*  No out-of-court mechanism put in place
(except for blanket restructuring program);
no changes  to bankruptcy framework.
Ownership sSructure
*  No changes48
Country  Government Resolution  Approach
AMC mechanism used  Decentralized Mechanisms  Growth  Other Impediments to Corporate  Results
Restructuring
Chile  None  Capital  position of  banks  The govermnent pursued tight  Across-the-board restructuring  schenmes  The decentralized approach  bailed  out (1981-86)  *  The public and private recapitalization  fiscal policy in the years  did not distinguish between  fints with  borrowers and strengthened  the capital
programs improved the capital base of banks  leading up to and during the  varying degrees of  difficulties.  The lack  position of  banks at a fiscal cost
to absorb losses.  crisis.  Chile also experienced  of realistic assessment  of  the conditions  estimated to exceed  40% of GDP.  But it
extraordinarily high real  of the schemes eroded its credibility in  helped to improve the corporate balance
Accounrtingframework  interest rates during the same  the long run.  Thus, repeated schemes  sheet, together with the economic
Bank Superintendency  cracked down on  period.  Beginning in 1982, the  reinforced the perception held by both  recovery beginning in  1985, thereby
excessive related lending in 198142 and  governient used monetary  debtors and creditors  alike of the  allowing for the reduction  of long-term
imposed loan limits to single  enterprises.  policy to actively moderate  govemment's readiness  to provide  indebtedness.  The restructuring
Such measures carne too late to reverse the  increases  in interest rates.  additional debt relief and led  to a serious  prograns  provided working capital and
deterioating situation.  In fact, the authorities  moral hazard problem. "  financial  relief for 700/o of debtors and
mistakenly perceived  the problemns  to be  helped  them regain their
temporary and allowed accounting flexibility  creditworthiness.a
to banks in reflecting their losses (e.g.
extending threhold for declaring delinquent
loans non-perfornning).  These practices were
dismantled  only in  1984-85.
Legalframework
*  Bankruptcy  framework remained outdated
and the judiciary system was slow.  In the
early 1980s, private agents were  allowed to
resolve bankruptcy cases by hiring
specialized  private consulting  firms to
engage in resolution (instead of  relying on
the government agcncy or the judicial
system).
Ownership structure
*  In 1982, the authorities enforced existing
ownership limits.  Also, the Banking Act of
1986 introduced stringent restrictions on
related lending.
F  For example, the  1982  loan purchase program was successful because banks were  still reluctant to stop rolling over  loans because it would  force them to start legal  action against delinquent debtors,
when it was still  likely that the govemment would provide additional relief.
a  As  of  end  1986,  the  financial  indicators of 100  firms  surveyed  whose  stock is traded  on  the Santiago  stock exchange  had improved  substantially,  a reflection of the  corporate  sector's improving
financial situation.  (World Bank 1987)49
Country  Government Resolutdon Approach
AMC mechanism used  Decentralized Mechanisms  Growth  Other Impediments to Corporate  Results
Restructuring
Hungary  None  Capitalposition  of  banks  Macroeconomic policy in the  *  The lack of capacity in banks to  *  Despite the repeated
(1991-95)  One of the recapitalization  *  The new strategy  taken by the government  early 1990s was characterized  conduct troubled debt restructuring  recapitalization,  some attempts to
programs intended to transfer  that came into power in 1995 was a  by a stalled fiscal reform and a  and the lack of  strategic skills  improve the accounting and legal
NPLs to a central  entity but  decentralized approach  to debt restructuring.  relaxed  rmonetary policy.  Real  among enterprise managers  framework (including out-of-court
the latter never became  Its reliance on eamest bank privatization  interest rates were negative in  discouraged  them from  conciliation), corporate
operational.  eventually led to  the strengthening of the  1992-93.  However, with a  participating in  the earlier  restructuring was limited.  In  about
banks'  capital base.  Its success  contrasts  newly elected government in  conciliation scheme.  two-thirds of the cases that entered
with the failure of prior public  1995, a reform program was  *  The repeated government financed  into the conciliation program,  the
recapitalization  programs.  launched and included  bailouts of 1991-93 without a bank  creditors  and debtors failed to reach
structural measures,  a strong  incentive  and regulatory framework  agreement.  Most claims were sold
Accountingframework  fiscal adjustment and sterilized  resulted in further inmprudent risk  through public tender to factoring
Banking Act of Dec 1991  introduced loan  monetary interventions.  taking and adverse selection in the  companies.
classification and provisioning  rules in line  corporate and fuancial sectors.  The  1995 pmgram that emphasized
with BIS standards.  But the responsibilities  bank privatmzation and
of supervision  were split between two  comprehensive  regulatory and
agencies and  weakened its function.  The  incentwve  framework proved  to be
1995 program  included  a comprehensive  more effective in upgrading  capital
reform  of regulations and bank supervision  bases and encouraging
powers.  restructuring.  The quality of bank
Legalframework  assets improved with the share of
*  A tough bankruptcy law took effect in Jan  loss and doubtful loans in the total
1992  and later amended in 1993.  While the  banking system's loan  portfolio
law  led to a substantial  number of filings for  declined steadily from 25% in 1993
bankruptcy  and  liquidation, such cases wem  to 3%  by the late  1990s.
subject to long delays in processing and
adjudication.  The 1993 bankruptcy
aamendment aimed to remedy certain
deficiencies  also partly led to the decline  in
the number of filings.  The 1995 pTogram
improved the efficiency of insolvency
proceedings.
*  1992  and 1993 recapitalization pmgrams
envisaged a transparent out-of-court  debt
conciliation procedure  in the face of
overburdened  courts and liquidators.  The
1992 program was thwarted by: (i)  the
absence of rules on how to settle state claims;
(ii) lack of clarity if debt-equity swaps were
legal or illegal.  The  1993 program became
mired in persistent interventions by
competing govemment ministries and moral
hazard concerns that contibuted  to its
termination.
Ownership structure
*  Towards the end of the 1990s, the largest
conunmercial banks had been privatized in
addition to other banks, largely  to foreign
investors.50
Country  Government Resolution Approach
AMC mechanism used  Decentralized Mechanisms  Growth  Other Impediments to Corporate  Results
Restructuring
Japan  Yes.  Authorities set up three  Accountingframework  The government put in place  *  With prospects for loan recovery  *  The authorities'  strategy for
(1991  - entities.  *  Until  1998, the  loan classification and loan  repeated fiscal stimulus  limited, banks had little incentive to  banking sector recovery was
ongoing)  Cooperative  Credit Purchase  loss provisioning  framework clearly favored  packages that boosted the  liquidate questionable parts of their  predicated on a resumpbon  of
Company  Was set up in  the hiding of losses rather  than the  budget deficit from 70 percent  portfolios, as the  cost of carrying  growth that would restore  banks
1993 as a mechanism for  recognition of losses.  Moreover, banks  of GDP to 120 percent and a  bad loans was insignificant due to  and borrowers to financial  strength
banks to transfer  loans at a  heavily used a mechanism of shifting their  loose monetary policy with  low interest rates, and potential  for  *  Yet, despite large and repeated
discount,  thus satisfying  losses off-balance by creating  related  ovemight rates  at zero percent  upswing in value of  asset is greater  fiscal stimulus packages  and loose
requirements in the tax law  companies which were neither subsidiaries  which  reduced the cost to  than that of a further loss.  monetary policy, sustained  growth
while avoiding the  nor affiliates and to which they non-  banks of carrying NPLs  *  Multiple liens attached  to most real  has not occurred.
bankruptcy of debtors  (loan  performing  loans at above market  value.  tremiendously and thus also  estate used as collateral  proved  *  Only recently did the  authorities
loss provisions are  reduced  banks' incentives to  difficult to rank, consolidate and  take a more aggressive approach  to
automatically tax deductible  Legalfrumework  restnucture  the loans.  cleir.  strengthening the framework for
only when they follow  *  Japan's present bankruptcy law is  *  In order for the government to  decentralized restructuring by
foreclosure  of collateral or  cumbesonme  and emphasizes  protectton of  force banks to restructure balance  strengthening the balance  sheets of
sale of loan at a loss).  Loan . creditor rights through  liquidation and a lack  sheets (dispose of the loans), the  banks with public money, moving
amount  transferred  Yen  15  of other mechanisms  that enable  debtors to  construction  industry would have  toward consolidated  accounting
trillion.  engage creditors  in negotiations.  While a  had to mark its assets to market  as  and increasing supervisory pressure
Housing  Loans  variety of mechanism exist for coUrt-  tax regulations do not favor banks'  on banks to recognize problem
Administration Corporation,  supervised reorganization, these have not  unilateral actions.  In the process,  loans.
Created in 1996  to resolve  proved to be effective tools for corporate  niany firmns  in the construction and  *  While these measures have  led to
within a  10 year period the  rehabilitation  which may have  contributed to  property related  industry would  an acceleration of corporate
loans of the 7 housing  unnecessary liquidations.  Moreover, the legal  likely have been declared insolvent  restructuring in  1999, much  still
companies that were closed in  infrastructure in Japan is not suited for  with adverse  implications on  remained to be done.
1995.  dealing with recovery and debt restsuctunng  employment
The Resolution and  in an expeditious  fashion.  Foreclosure and  *  Corporate restructuring  has faced
Collection Bank  Was created  bankruptcy procedures are cumbersonme  and  significant institutional
in 1995 to  deal with the assets  can be time consuming.  Moreover, all loans  ignedifents such as the high cost
of failed credit cooperatives  are extended  on a full recourse basis,  to fisms of reducing
and had received loans of  face  implying that foreclosure of one loan would  untrmsploynent Court  n  lingg in the
value of Y 1.5  trillion in the  threaten  the whole comnpany.  late 1  970s made dismissals
first half of 1998.  *  Compounding the legal ftamework  issues is  cumnbersomTe  which led  firms to
All three agencies  have been  the fact that the capacity of  bankruptcy courtS  offer voluntry early retirement
very  slow in selling the  in Japan  is limited as there are  only two  programs.  In  1999, the  authorities
assets.  bankruptcy courts,  nxoved to introduce measures to
*  Before the crisis, the lack of effective  formal  facilitate labor mobility and the
procedures might not have caused a major  serpping of  excess capaciry.
problem because  banks were not financially
constrained  and thus  could initiate  work-outs.
*  In  1999, the govemment presented legislation
to Parliament  attempting  to facilitate  the
formal corporate restructuring  framework.
Ownership strciure:
*  Limited changes  in ownership  structure  have
taken  place  and  the  complex  web  of
relationships  between  bank  shareholders  and
main  customrns  reduced  the  incentives  for
banks to address bad debt problem.51
Country  Government Resolution Approach
AMC mechanism used  Decentralized Mechanisms  Growth  Other Inpediments to Corporate  Results
Restructuring
Norway  None  CapUalposition  of bns  An expansionary  fiscal policy  With a proper bankruptcy framework,
(1987 -93)  *  Public recapitalization  accompanied by the  and considerable  tax relief  strengthened  accounting regulations, the
requireffent for banks to improve operating  (associated with  the tax  absence  of  ownership  links between
profits and reduce risk-weighted asses  reform) prevailed  in 1992.  The  banks and debtors and recapitalized
improved the capacity of the banking system  floating of the Norwegian  banks, the decentralized  approach proved
to sustain  losses.  currency in late  1992 led to a  successful  as banks and fitms began to
monetary and exchange policy  tum around in the last year of  the ctisis.
Accountingframework  aimed at the maintenance of
*  With increased competition after the  the exchange rate against
deregulation,  baiks increased  lending in the  European currencies at the
1980s in real estate and stocks  thereby  1993 level.  Money growth
increasing their exposure  to *noveoents in  slowed thereafter.
asset prices.
*  Before  1987, there  were no specific
regulations  on loss provisions.  Regulations
were issued only in  1987 which led to an
increase  in provisions.  In 1990, bank
supervision was strengthened.
Legalframework
*  Banks could file for bankauptcy  of firms at
any time during the crisis.
Ownership  structure
*  Public injection of capital  resulted in the
transfer of the three largest private banks into
state hands.52
Country  Government Resolution  Approach
AMC mechanism used  Decentralized Mechanisms  Growth  Other tmpedimensts to Corporate  Results
Restructuring
Poland  None  Capital  position ofbanks  The period was characterized  *  Lack of developed secondary  *  As of March  1994,  the banks (1992 - 95)  *  Public recapitalization  strengthened  the  by pnudent  macroecononmic  markets and problems with  tax  completed  debt conciliation capital base of the commercial  banks that  policies allowing for a gradual  treatment initially discouragcd  debt  procedures  with respect to debtors
participated in the restructuring progran.  declines in inflation.  The  sales and swaps.  whose debts amounted to 83% of Two state-owned  specialized  banks remained  authorities exercised sorme  *  Tax deductibility  for loan  write-  classified  loans.  25% of the total problem ridden, including  weak capital  flexibility with interest rates,  offs and associated corporate tax  enterprises that entered  into bank positions.  In  1996, enforcement of  though they were niaintained at  changes was not adopted until  conciliations went into bankruptcy accounting standards  were viewed to lead to  positive real levels,.  1994.  or liquidation.  The rest regained some other banks to be out of  compliance  creditworthiness  or their debts were with questionable capacity to absorb losses.  auctioned  off  by banks or their
collateral seized"  "  Banking Accountingframework  system NPLs  fell from 28%  of total *  Interest due but not received was made not  loans in  1992 to 10% in  1997.  so taxable in 1992.  Bank regulations  were  The ovcrall cvidence on operatonal tightened just before  the introduction of the  restructuring by enterprises in restructuring program.  Troubled debt  Poland during the period covered restructuring  rules  were adopted during the  by the restructuring program and restructuring period.  Despite upgraded  thereafter points to a notably banking regulations  in 1992-93,  problems  sluggish pace.  However, a World remained  in the  quality and application of  Bank survey of some  1000 Polish adequate  accounting  standards for some  firnms  between  1992 and  1995 banks that were  not included  in the  alludes to evidence  that sorne restructuring  program.  restructuring has taken place as
80% of those enterprises  showed Legalframework  irmprovements  in their degree  of *  Govemment  allowed enterprises to enter into  profitability or loss-making.
out-of-court Chapter  II  typc procedure,
called conciliatory agreements  led by the
banks.  If a bank participating in the
restructuring program  failed to reach
agreement with a nonviable debtor,  the bank
was required  to file for bankruptcy  or sell the
bad loans.
Ownership  structure
v  Privatization of the banking system  was slow
with over  WI./o  of the banking  system still  in
state hands in  1996.53
Country  Government Resolution Approach
AMC mechanism used  Decentralized Mechanisms  Growth  Other Impediments to Corporate  Results
Restrucuring
Thailand  Only used  for liquidation of  Capital  position of  banks  After a brief initial period of  Despite the govemrnments efforts to
(1997 - assets of closed finance  *  Despite public and private injection of capital  tight fiscal  and monetary  strengthen the decentralized  mechanisms
ongoing)  companies that accounted for  in banks, banks  remained capital constrained  policy, the government  for corporate  restructuring, meaningful
2% of  assets.  and  would  have  been  at  least  severely  implemented  fiscal stimulus  progress on the corporate restructuring
undercapitalized  if they  had  acknowledged  programs and  lowered interest  side remains  limited.  As of 2000, not
loan  losses  properly  and  thus  continued  to  rates to historical low levels.  surprisingly, banks  restructured mostly
lack the loss absorption capacity to enpge in  those assets that were "easy to
any meaningful restructuring.  restructure",  i. e. where financially
sustainable  structures could be achieved
Accounllngfraznework  by  srbetching maturities  or lowering of
*  While  loan classification and loan loss  interest rates.  According  to analysis of
provisioning  strengthened; framework still  companies'  balance sheets, the
not in line with international best practice  restructuring of these NPLs largely
and  still favors hiding of losses.  required haircuts, debi to equity swaps
Lep]  fiwmwork  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~and  liquidation.  Yet, banks continued  to Legal  fbameworck  be capital constrained  and lacked the
*  Reform  of bankruptcy  law  but creditors  still  tools to force debtors to the negotiating
lacked  tools  to  force  foreclosure  and  table. After almost three years, armunt
liquidation  and  judicial  capacity  renained  of NPLs still stood at 38 percent. In
limited.  The formal  bankruptcy  regime  was  2002, system wide NPLs amounted to
complemented  with  out of court  framework  one-third of total loans.
but it has limited sticks and carrots.
Ownership strixtures
*  While concentation of family ownership
declined sonewhat during crisis, it continues
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